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INTRODUCTION: CULTURE WAR AND RELIGION
There is unquestionably a growing cultural divide in this
country, a polarization that resembles nothing so much as a war.
Rather than being fought with guns and bayonets, the implements of the fight are ideas or, more precisely, political worldviews. The battlefronts span the horizons of intellectual endeavor. Disciplines such as science, ethics, education, law, and
journalism are inescapably involved. None of them, however,
constitutes the most fundamental fault line of the conflict. That
distinction belongs to religion; and why should this fact be surprising? Paul Tillich, and Friedrich Schleiermacher before him,
reminded us years ago that there is a symbiotic relationship between religion and culture. Schleiermacher, addressing the “cultured despisers” of religion, described it as “the profoundest
depths whence every feeling and conception receives its form.”1
Tillich, in a similar vein, wrote that “religion is the substance of
culture, [while] culture is the form of religion.”2 The roots of the
current cultural tug-of-war lie deeply embedded in the participants’ respective political assessments of religion, whether orthodox and fundamentalist or liberal and progressive. Hence,
when one speaks of such a “culture war,” one question becomes
relevant—“Does God belong in American public life?”

1 FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER, ON RELIGION: SPEECHES TO ITS CULTURED
DESPISERS 11 (John Oman trans., Harper Torchbooks 1958) (1799).
2 PAUL TILLICH, THEOLOGY OF CULTURE 42 (Robert C. Kimball ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1972) (1959).
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Approach to the Question

The question is a weighty one, and the answers provided by
commentators are often characterized by subtle nuance and meticulous qualification. A social pundit may respond negatively to
a state Supreme Court Justice who, hearing the appeal of a child
custody case, quotes Leviticus 18:22 in condemnation of the lesbianism of the mother.3 But the same pundit may be reserved in
his or her criticism when a United States President concludes his
inaugural address with the words “God bless America.” Gradations of criticism tend to be part and parcel of any expanded
treatment of the above-stated question.
Yet it lies beyond the scope of this article to probe these multifarious distinctions. The goal here is a modest one. I will first
consider whether public life in this country was initially intended
under the newly proposed Constitution of 1787 to be a secular affair, and I will argue that the answer is far from a definitive
“yes.” I will then seek to explain why, in light of the indecisive
answers that history gives us, the American public sphere is
largely a secular place and what the U.S. Supreme Court’s role
has been in that process, from approximately the middle of the
twentieth century to the present.
To fulfill this goal, in Parts I and II of this Article, I will set
forth and analyze the thesis of Kramnick and Moore that ours is
a “Godless Constitution”4 intended to comprise the foundation of
a secular state. In Parts III and IV, I will describe the tidal wave
of secularism that overwhelmed American culture in the nineteenth century and critically analyze the manner in which the
Supreme Court rode that cultural wave in its interpretation of
the Establishment Clause during the twentieth century. In
Parts V and VI, I will dissect the Court’s two recent decisions regarding the public display of the Ten Commandments5 and then
analyze the opinions advanced by the various Justices. Finally, I
will conclude with some of my thoughts concerning how the Supreme Court should interpret the Religion Clauses.
I. HIGHLIGHTS OF KRAMNICK’S AND MOORE’S ARGUMENT
A. The Thesis
Kramnick and Moore argue in favor “of the godless Constitu3 See Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891, 896 (S.D. 1992) (Henderson, J., concurring in part; dissenting in part).
4 ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: A MORAL
DEFENSE OF THE SECULAR STATE (2005) (1996) [hereinafter GODLESS CONSTITUTION].
5 Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2856 (2005) and McCreary v. ACLU of Kentucky, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2727–28 (2005).
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tion and of godless politics.”6 They insist that the Founders
“sought to separate the operations of government from any claim7
that human beings can know and follow divine direction in reaching policy decisions.”8 The Constitution and the political state to
which it gave birth were on an “intentionally secular base.”9 Our
founding document, they point out, was vehemently denounced
by many during the Framers’ own time as a godless one, precisely because it was and is such.10 Nowhere within its text is
there a substantive reference to deity.11
B. Constitution Contrasted with Other American Documents
Consider the radical difference in this respect between the
Constitution on the one hand and the Declaration of Independence and the Articles of Confederation of 1776 on the other. The
Declaration mentioned “Nature’s God” and the “Creator.” The
Articles similarly referred to “the Great Governor of the World.”
Yet the Constitution maintains a conspicuous silence in this regard.12
C. Exclusion of Religious Tests
The only reference to religion that resulted from the work of
the Constitutional Convention was a negative one: “no religious
GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 12.
Kramnick and Moore take aim squarely at the Christian Right. Id. at 157–61. It
is an obtrusive target. One more difficult than that is religion in general, which Kramnick’s and Moore’s thesis is also intended to address. That America was never intended to
be a Christian state is spelled out in the Treaty of Tripoli, but that all state and statesupported activity in this country was intended to be divorced from the religious is impossible to prove. See Article II of the Treaty of Tripoli, in THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE 121–23 (Forrest Church ed., 2004) [hereinafter SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE). See also SIDNEY E. MEAD, THE LIVELY EXPERIMENT: THE SHAPING OF
CHRISTIANITY IN AMERICA 38–49 (1963) [hereinafter LIVELY EXPERIMENT]; Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, in BEYOND BELIEF: ESSAYS ON RELIGION IN A POSTTRADITIONAL WORLD 168 (University of California Press 1991) (1970) [hereinafter Civil
Religion].
8 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 12. I do not altogether agree with the
following statement by Erez Kalir in review of Kramnick’s and Moore’s book: “The first
problem with [the book]—and the genesis of several others—lies in the authors’ failure to
define exactly what they mean by the title phrase, and especially by the term ‘godless.’”
Erez Kalir, Book Review: Is the Constitution “Godless” or Just Nondenominational?, 106
YALE L.J. 917, 919 (1996). It is reasonably clear that Kramnick and Moore have embraced
the classical liberal idea that religion, personified by “God,” has no role to play in public
policymaking. The authors demonstrate an indifference toward the religious that borders
upon hostility.
9 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 14.
10 Id. at 23.
11 In Article VII of the document the date is written as “the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven.” U.S.
CONST. art. VII. This reference to “our Lord” is hardly to be interpreted as a resounding
expression of religious faith.
12 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 28.
6
7
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Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or
public Trust under the United States.”13 Luther Martin, a delegate to the Convention from Maryland, commenting upon the
almost unanimous passage of this provision, observed the following:
[T]here were some members so unfashionable . . . as to think that a belief in the existence of a Deity and of a state of future rewards and punishments would be some security for the good conduct of our rulers,
and that in a Christian country it would be at least decent to hold out
some distinction between the professors of Christianity and downright
infidelity or paganism.14

Oliver Ellsworth, a delegate to the Philadelphia Convention
from Connecticut, who would later become a United States Senator and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, also was critical
of the notion of a religious test as a qualification for public office.15 He argued that, in view of the many diverse religious denominations in the United States, “[a] test in favour of any one
denomination of christians would be to the last degree absurd.”16
The Constitutional Convention’s antipathy to religious tests
in the political sphere was paralleled by its refusal even to discuss Benjamin Franklin’s suggestion that each session of the
Convention be opened with a prayer.17
D. Responses to the Absence of Religious Reference
The Convention’s apparent lack of enthusiasm for religion,
along with the secular bent of the Constitution itself, did not go
unnoticed by the American citizenry. Colonel William Jones, a
delegate to Massachusetts’ ratification convention, was outspoken against the document’s exclusion of religious oaths, declaring
that “publick men were to be of those who had a good standing in
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 29 (quoting Luther Martin). Martin’s
estimate of this provision is the same as that of the Reverend Daniel Shute, who in the
Massachusetts ratification convention spoke in favor of it, when he stated:
Nor is there to me any conceivable advantage, sir, that would result in the
whole from such a test. Unprincipled and dishonest men will not hesitate to
subscribe to any thing, that may open the way for their advancement, and put
them into a situation the better to execute their base and iniquitous designs.
Honest men alone, therefore, however well qualified to serve the publick,
would be excluded by it, and their country be deprived of the benefit of their
abilities.
The Reverend Daniel Shute and Colonel William Jones on Religious Tests and Christian
Belief (Jan. 31, 1788), in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, pt. 1, at 919 (Bernard Bailyn
ed., Library of America 1993) [hereinafter THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION].
15 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 42.
16 Oliver Ellsworth, “A Landholder” VII, CONN. COURANT (Hartford), Dec. 17, 1787,
in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, pt. 1, at 523.
17 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 34.
13
14
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the church” and “that a person could not be a good man without
being a good Christian.”18 Henry Abbot, a North Carolinian, echoed the concern of many that “[t]he exclusion of religious tests
is . . . dangerous and impolitic,” and concluded “that if there be
no religious test required, Pagans, Deists and Mahometans
might obtain offices among us, and that the Senate and Representatives might all be Pagans.”19 The Reverend David Caldwell,
also from North Carolina, took an equally negative view of the religious oath exclusion. For him, it amounted to little more than
“an invitation to ‘Jews and pagans of every kind’ to govern us.”20
William Williams, a delegate to the Connecticut ratification
convention, was uneasy and troubled by the lack of any acknowledgment in the Constitution of “the being of a God . . . [and] his
perfections and his providence.”21 He favored editing its Preamble, suggesting that its opening words be the following:
We the people of the United States, in a firm belief of the being
and perfections of the one living and true God, the creator and supreme Governour of the world, in his universal providence and the authority of his laws: that he will require of all moral agents an account
of their conduct, that all rightful powers among men are ordained of,
and mediately derived from God, therefore in a dependence on his
blessing and acknowledgment of his efficient protection in establishing our Independence, whereby it is become necessary to agree upon
and settle a Constitution of federal government for ourselves . . . .22

The suggestion failed to find a winning following.
Kramnick and Moore observe that a similar suggestion,
made during the height of the Civil War, also went nowhere. In
1863, the National Association for the Amendment of the Constitution, soon renamed the National Reform Association and directed by Presbyterian layman John Alexander, proposed the following alteration of the Preamble:
We, the people of the United States, humbly acknowledging Almighty God as the source of all authority and power in civil government, The Lord Jesus Christ as the Governor among the Nations, and
His revealed will as of supreme authority, in order to constitute a
18 Id. at 32. See also The Reverend Daniel Shute and Colonel William Jones on Religious Tests and Christian Belief, supra note 14, at 920.
19 Henry Abbot and James Iredell Debate the Ban on Religious Tests: Could Not the
Pope Be President? (July 30, 1788), in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 14,
pt. 2, at 902.
20 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 32 (quoting Rev. David Caldwell and
Samuel Spencer Continue the Debate on Religious Toleration, in THE DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION (July 30, 1788), supra note 14, pt. 2, at 908).
21 William Williams to the Printer (Feb. 11, 1788), in THE DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, pt. 2, at 193. See also GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note
4, at 37.
22 William Williams to the Printer, supra note 21, at 193–94 (emphasis omitted).
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Christian government . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution
for the United States of America.23

The proposal was brought to the attention of President Lincoln who, while respectful of and cordial to those who supported
it, observed that “the work of amending the Constitution should
not be done hastily.”24 The President, in the secular spirit of the
Founders, simply allowed the proposal to die its own natural
death.
This evidence, according to our authors, demonstrates that
the lack of substantive religious reference in the Constitution, as
the document emerged from the Philadelphia Convention, was
hardly a happenstance, but was intended by its Framers, and
later accepted by the states and thoughtful leaders like Lincoln
who came along in American history, to convey a strong message
in favor of the separation of church and state.25
E. Roger Williams: Religion and Secular Politics
The doctrine of church-state separation was, Kramnick and
Moore maintain, solidly embedded in liberal and religious
thought, both in America and in England. The roots of the doctrine in this country go back to the religious leader Roger Williams, who pioneered it in his book, The Bloudy Tenant of Persecution.26 Religious purity and good government were, for him,
two separate and distinct concerns.27 There was, he taught, no
necessary correlation between being a good and steadfast governmental official on the one hand and a religious believer on the
other.28 Nor would there ever be justifiable cause for the government to support religion, either directly or indirectly, since
the Kingdom of God was and is not of this world.29 Williams subscribed to the proposition that religion is fundamentally a private
concern of conscience.30 Although he never went so far as to
maintain that religious belief is irrelevant to public policy,31 believing as he did that elected officials were not immune from religious influence32 and that the state should, in keeping with the
Ten Commandments, enjoin murder, thievery, and adultery,33
GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 146.
Id. at 146–47.
Id. at 12, 66.
Id. at 48; ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOUDY TENANT OF PERSECUTION FOR CAUSE OF
CONSCIENCE (Richard Groves ed., Mercer Univ. Press 2001) (1644).
27 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 52.
28 See id. at 53–54.
29 See id. at 52.
30 Id. at 59–60.
31 Id. at 53.
32 Id. at 61.
33 Id. at 60.
23
24
25
26
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Williams was strongly insistent that religious morality should be
distinguished from national pieties and that governmental officials should never claim to act in God’s name or under his authority.34
F. The Lockean State and Religious Freedom
Religious freedom, understood through the frame of churchstate separation, had been advocated not only by the influentially
religious in America, but had also been promoted and defended
by the most thoughtfully liberal in England, with John Locke being the foremost example. Kramnick and Moore stress that
American personages such as John Adams, John Otis, Samuel
Adams, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, Patrick Henry, and
Benjamin Franklin were supremely indebted to Locke’s intellectual treasury.35 He believed in a minimal government, the function of which was to preserve life, liberty, and especially property
and, aside from that, was to stay out of people’s lives.36 One’s
right to secure property is accorded by God and natural law,37
and government treads upon this right at the expense of violating nature and becoming tyrannous.38 Locke’s conception of government is therefore, according to our authors, “purely negative.”39 It does little more than to establish the ground rules by
which to compete for wealth and property.40 By no means should
the political state attempt to defend or to promote moral and religious truths or any particular notion of good.41
Locke’s minimalist, or laissez faire, view of government allows him to draw a bold line of demarcation between political and
religious issues. The government must take care not to encroach
upon the latter, which is solely a matter of private provenance.42
Religious beliefs do not concern the state; they neither prejudice
Id. at 61.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 73. See also JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 178 (Mark Goldie ed., Everyman 1993) (1689), in which the
author maintains that a person is willing to leave the state of nature and to unite with
others “for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the
general name, property.” Locke stresses that the protection of one’s property is the primary rationale for government. Id.
37 LOCKE, supra note 36, at 130–31.
38 See id. at 217. Locke quotes King James I as saying, “whereas the proud and ambitious tyrant doth think, his kingdom and people are only ordained for satisfaction of his
desires . . . the righteous and just king doth by the contrary acknowledge himself to be
ordained for the procuring of the wealth and property of his people.” Id.
39 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 73.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 73–74.
42 Id. at 75. See also JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 28–29 (Prentice Hall 1950) (1689) [hereinafter TOLERATION], in which he argues that religion is a private, personal matter.
34
35
36
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another’s property rights nor injure him or her in any way.43
These structural limitations serve to carve out an ample area for
the free, unmolested exercise of religion and for the mutual toleration of sectarian differences.44 For Locke, civil government is
concerned with outward force, while “[a]ll the life and power of
true religion consist in the inward and full persuasion of the
mind.”45 The punitive power of the state can never be of assistance in the salvation of souls,46 for the church is “a thing absolutely separate and distinct from the commonwealth.”47
Locke’s vision of religious freedom, conceptualized as a private sphere of ritual and belief, to be distinguished and separated from the public domain of the state, deeply imbued itself
upon the minds of the Framers and was reflected in the secular
character of the Constitution that they proposed.48
G. Thomas Jefferson and the “Wall Of Separation”
1. Jefferson and Locke
Thomas Jefferson regarded Locke as one of “the three greatest men that have ever lived, without any exception.”49 Jefferson
was familiar with the latter’s Second Treatise of Government, and
on at least one occasion commended it to a friend as one of a
group of excellent and influential works concerning politics.50
Locke’s minimalist state appealed to Jefferson.51 Both men
GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 78.
See TOLERATION, supra note 42, at 17, in which Locke explains that “[c]ivil interests” consist of “life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and the possession of outward
things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like,” and that the jurisdiction of
the state “reaches only to these civil concernments . . . and that it neither can nor ought in
any manner to be extended to the salvation of souls.”
45 Id. at 18.
46 Id. at 19.
47 Id. at 27.
48 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 77–78.
49 See FRANK LAMBERT, THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN
AMERICA 161 (2003) [hereinafter THE FOUNDING FATHERS] (pointing out that Jefferson
commissioned John Trumbull as artist to paint portraits of Francis Bacon, Isaac Newton,
and John Locke on the same canvas in order that these personages might be given a place
of honor at Monticello and “not be confounded at all with the herd of other great men”)
(quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, To John Trumbull, in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON
434, 435 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., Penguin Books 1977) (1975)). Compare NOBLE E.
CUNNINGHAM, JR., IN PURSUIT OF REASON: THE LIFE OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 129 (Ballantine Books 1988) (1987), where the author relates that Jefferson “asked Trumbull to
purchase for him in England [portraits] of Bacon, Locke, and Newton.”
50 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 82. Jefferson describes the work as
“Locke’s little book on government.” Id.
51 Id. at 70. When describing Jefferson’s view of the state, Kramnick and Moore
write: “That government was best which governed least, as Jefferson put it.” Id. It
should be noted that there is no evidence that the third President ever wrote or uttered
such words. While they are often attributed to him in error, they accurately portray his
understanding.
43
44
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favored and supported a policy of laissez faire not only in politics,
but also in religion. Kramnick and Moore observe that “[t]he
Declaration of Independence reads like a paraphrase”52 of the
Second Treatise. They also point out that, in his Notes on the
State of Virginia, Jefferson wrote of religion that “it does me no
injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods, or no god. It
neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.”53 The passage
brings to mind the words of Locke, who argued that religious
matters should not be regulated by the state, “because they are
not prejudicial to other men’s rights, nor do they break the public
peace of societies.”54 Both thinkers, state Kramnick and Moore,
were committed to the idea that religion has no place in the public and political sector, but belongs exclusively to the realm of
personal and private opinion.55
2. A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom
Jefferson’s understanding of the relationship between church
and state was enacted into Virginia law in 1786. Styled “A Bill
for Establishing Religious Freedom,” it stated in part
that no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious
worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer, on account of his religious opinions or belief; but that all
men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their opinions in matters of religion, and that the same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities.56

The bill was shepherded through the Virginia Assembly by
none other than master strategist James Madison and, in the estimation of Kramnick and Moore, constituted a “comprehensive
call for a total separation of church and state.”57 The clergy, as
might be expected, condemned the measure as indicative of a disregard for public worship and an indifference to religion.58
3. Jefferson and the Clergy
Our authors further note that Jefferson had little use for the
clergy. Many of them reciprocated the animus and thought that
Id. at 72.
THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, QUERY XVII (1787), reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 283, 285 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) [hereinafter WRITINGS].
54 TOLERATION, supra note 42, at 42; see GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at
87.
55 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 96.
56 THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1789), reprinted in
WRITINGS, supra note 53, at 346, 347.
57 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 92.
58 Id. at 91–92.
52
53
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his election to the Presidency would jeopardize their place in
American life. Jefferson privately responded to their dislike of
him in a missive to his friend Benjamin Rush:
They . . . believe that any portion of power confided to me, will be exerted in opposition to their schemes. And they believe rightly: for I
have sworn upon the altar of God, eternal hostility against every form
of tyranny over the mind of man. But this is all they have to fear from
me: and enough too in their opinion.59

Interestingly enough, an excerpt from this passage appears
in the Jefferson Memorial. Many churchgoing Americans, observe Kramnick and Moore, scarcely realize that the very words
memorializing Jefferson are those which comprise an attack
upon the Philadelphia clergy.60
Yet not all clergy were averse to Jefferson. Some, like Baptist ministers Isaac Backus and John Leland, supported him in
his bid to become President. These and other evangelicals resented the fact that state governments were attempting to define
religious doctrines and to impose them upon everyone by force of
law.61 Baptists were impressed by the fact that Jefferson had
written and inspired the passage of the statute establishing religious freedom in Virginia and stood firmly for the liberty for
which they had been struggling.62
4. Jefferson’s Correspondence with the Danbury Baptist
Association
After Jefferson was elected President, Baptists from the
Danbury Baptist Association in Connecticut wrote a letter to him
setting forth, in part, their concern that their religious privileges
in that state were enjoyed merely as “favors granted” and not as
“inalienable rights.”63 In his letter of reply, Jefferson underscored a belief they and he shared in common, i.e., “that religion
59 Id. at 69 (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to Dr. Benjamin Rush (Sept. 23,
1800), reprinted in WRITINGS, supra note 53, at 1080, 1082, available at
http://www.positiveatheism.org/hist/jeff1080.htm).
60 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 69.
61 Id. at 110–21. There were churches that separated from the Congregational establishment in New England. Some of these churches became Baptist. Id. at 116. Not
being part of the protected religious establishment, they were still required either to pay
financial support to the established church or to obtain a formal certificate declaring that
they were exempt from it. Id. at 114–15. Backus and Leland strongly opposed the idea of
a Christian commonwealth that employed sanctions of law in this manner. Although they
were not disciples of Locke and were not known for being political theorists, they recognized that their view of religious freedom shared an affinity with Jefferson’s liberal philosophy. Id. at 110–11, 116–17, 119–20.
62 Id. at 119.
63 Correspondence with the Danbury Baptist Association, 1801–1802, in DANIEL L.
DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND
STATE app. 6, at 142, 143 (2002).
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is a matter which lies solely between Man & his God, that he
owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, [and] that
the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, & not
opinions.”64 The President then stated the following: “I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American
people which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof,’ thus building a wall of separation between
Church & State.”65 According to Kramnick and Moore, Baptists
“gave qualified support to Jefferson’s wall of separation between
church and state,” and they “agreed with [him] that America had
not been founded as a Christian nation.”66
5. Jefferson’s Respect for Separationism
Jefferson showed respect for the “wall of separation” when he
abandoned the practice of his predecessors in proclaiming national days of prayer, fasting, and thanksgiving.67 He couched
his inaction in terms of the state’s not infringing upon religion
rather than in terms of the churches attempting to preempt the
powers of state.68
H. Undermining the Secular Ideal
1. Religious Holidays and the Appointment of Chaplains
Kramnick and Moore point out that there have been remarkable deviations from the secular ideal of government advanced in the Constitution. Two of them involved none other
than James Madison, whose views on church and state are
thought to have closely approximated those of his political mentor Thomas Jefferson.69 One deviation occurred while Madison
was President. During the War of 1812, Congress requested that
there be a day “of public humiliation and prayer.”70 Under inId. at 148 (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I). Kramnick and Moore argue
that Jefferson’s celebrated metaphor was inspired by James Burgh’s book Crito, published
in 1767, in which Burgh argued that it was necessary to “build an impenetrable wall of
separation between things sacred and civil.” See GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at
83 (quoting JAMES BURGH, 2 CRITO, OR ESSAYS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 119 (London, 1767)).
66 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 119. The authors do, however, point out
that Isaac Backus took issue with Jefferson on numerous points. For example, Backus
did not seem to oppose the assertion that the United States was a Christian nation, and
he supported a religious test for officeholders that discriminated against Roman Catholics. Id. at 119–20.
67 Id. at 96.
68 Id. at 96–97.
69 SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 7, at 132.
70 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 105 (quoting James Madison, A Proclamation (July 9, 1812), in 24 ANNALS OF CONG. 2223, available at
http://www.wallbuilders.com/resources/search/detail.php?ResourceID=39).
64
65
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tense pressure from both politicians and clerics alike, the President acceded to the request, in contravention of his apparently
firmly held view that religious matters constituted no part of
government polity. Another deviation occurred in 1787, when
Madison was a Congressman and voted to support the appointment of chaplains to Congress, which appointment Kramnick and
Moore state that he unsuccessfully opposed.71
2. The Coinage
The authors also observe that the Constitution was undermined when God entered the United States currency in 1863.
During the height of the Civil War, Horace Bushnell, the famous
Connecticut preacher, decried the influence of Thomas Jefferson’s
view that government should be a godless endeavor and interpreted the bloody carnage of the War as divine retribution for the
country’s acceptance of that view. Secretary of the Treasury,
Salmon P. Chase, in response to such religious sentiment, decided to recommend a religious motto for one-cent and two-cent
coinage. The motto finally approved by Chase and the Congress
was “IN GOD WE TRUST.”72 Thereafter, it became commonplace on United States currency.
3. Sunday Movement and Delivery of the Mail
The authors also describe the bitter conflict between the
church and the state, from 1810 to 1912, over the Sunday movement and delivery of the mail.73 In 1810, Congress enacted legislation which provided that the mail would move every day and
that post offices would be open for at least an hour each day. By
1815, clergymen and their churches were actively urging the repeal of the legislation, although their attack upon it was ultimately unsuccessful.74
71 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 105. But compare Marsh v. Chambers,
463 U.S. 783, 788, 788 n.8 (1983), in which Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the majority, points out that the House of Representatives elected its first chaplain on May 1, 1789,
and that Madison voted for the bill authorizing payment of the chaplains for both the
House and the Senate. Id. at 788, n.8.
72 See United States Department of the Treasury, Fact Sheet on the History of “In
God
We
Trust,”
http://www.ustreas.gov/education/fact-sheets/currency/in-god-wetrust.shtml (last visited Oct. 10, 2006). According to this source, Secretary Chase was
moved to the decision by a letter to him from Rev. M.R. Watkinson, from Ridleyville,
Pennsylvania. A portion of the letter is as follows: “One fact touching our currency has
hitherto been seriously overlooked. I mean the recognition of the Almighty God in some
form on our coins.” The clergyman asked, “What if our Republic were not shattered beyond reconstruction? Would not the antiquaries of succeeding centuries rightly reason
from our past that we were a heathen nation?” Rev. Watkinson’s suggestion was a coin
with the name of God inscribed upon it. Id.
73 See GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at ch. 7.
74 Id. at 133–34.
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But in 1828, a second frontal assault was directed by Christians, principally by clergyman Lyman Beecher and evangelical
businessman Josiah Bissell, Jr. They urged a strategy of boycott
against all companies that operated on Sunday and sent over 900
petitions to Congress demanding repeal of the 1810 legislation.75
With the advent of the railroad and the telegraph, the commercial atmosphere in America changed significantly, with the
result that seven-day mail service lost its compelling economic
rationale. Kramnick and Moore point out that by the 1850s most
of the Sunday movement of mail was slowed, if not eliminated,
and that, in the aftermath of the Civil War, the trend grew.76 By
1912, Congress had closed all post offices that remained open on
Sunday.77
4. “Under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance
Our authors argue that the entry of God into the Pledge of
Allegiance undermined the “godless federal constitutional structure,” which the Framers erected.78 America was in the midst of
the Cold War and was threatened by communism, primarily of
the Soviet variety. The Knights of Columbus, the Reverend Billy
Graham, President Eisenhower, and the United States Congress
all believed that the country’s ultimate protection from the threat
was to be found “under God.”79 So in 1954, a half century after
Francis Bellamy’s Pledge had been adopted, the phrase “under
God” was incorporated into it.80
Contemplating the next time the Supreme Court will address Michael Newdow’s claim that this phrase in the Pledge violates the Establishment Clause, Kramnick and Moore are admittedly troubled by the prospect that the Court may decide “that
being religious, i.e., recognizing the existence of a deity”81 is what
it means to be a patriot. They write, “[t]his should be deeply
Id. at 135–36.
Id. at 142.
Id.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 196. See also SUSAN JACOBY, FREETHINKERS: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
SECULARISM 308 (2004). Jacoby underscores the role played by the Knights of Columbus
and the Roman Catholic Church in the adoption of the “under God” language, although
she makes clear that not only Catholics, but also Protestants and Jews were involved in
the venture. She further explains the Roman Catholic hierarchy’s leadership of the
movement to incorporate the phrase into the Pledge “represented a major tactical change”
on their part with regard to public education. Instead of attempting to banish all vestiges
of Protestantism from the schools, the Roman Catholic leaders would support religious
ideas in public schools that did not violate their own doctrine. Id. at 308–09.
80 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 196.
81 Id. at 197. See also L. Scott Smith, From Typology to Synthesis: Re-Casting the
Jurisprudence of Religion, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 51, 80–95 (2005) [hereinafter From Typology
to Synthesis] (analyzing Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004)).
75
76
77
78
79
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worrisome to all of us, whether one be personally religious or not.
The question of whether God exists or not is not a question that
should be before our legislative bodies and our courts, whatever a
majority might say.”82
Although Kramnick and Moore emphasize that the Constitution created a secular state, they highlight that this secularism
“is a precious but confused legacy, one that Americans have
fought over since the beginning of the republic.”83 In spite of
prominent deviations from the constitutional ideal, the hope is
that “the state and religion will not conflict and that each will
work in complementary ways to lead us toward the creation of a
just society.”84 The formula by which the hope will be realized,
according to the authors, is that of the separation of church and
state, a standard that they freely acknowledge is in trouble.85
II. ANALYSIS
A. An Argument from Silence
The fact that the Constitution contains no positive reference
to religion and no reference to God whatsoever is not proof that
the document was intended to create a secular state. For Kramnick and Moore to rest their thesis, even in part, upon this foundation amounts to an argument from silence. It is like stating
that, because no American President has invoked the name of
Christ in an inaugural address, it follows that none has professed
Christianity. One must remember that, when the Constitution
initially emerged from the Philadelphia Convention and was presented to the states for ratification, there was no mention of the
freedom of speech, the freedom of assembly, the right to bear
arms, or the right against cruel and unusual punishment, to
name but a few of the Framers’ most notable silences. If one had
lived in that day and had drawn the conclusion from such silence
that the Framers were not favorably disposed to such rights and
freedoms, he or she certainly would have been mistaken.
1. The Issue of States’ Rights
There are multiple inferences which one may draw concerning why the Constitution contains no reference to deity. Kramnick’s and Moore’s thesis that the Founders desired to create a
secular state and a “godless politic” comprises only one such inference, and perhaps the least convincing one at that. It would
82
83
84
85

GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 197.
Id. at 200.
Id.
Id.
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certainly be as easy to reason that, under the federalist system of
government that the Founders were proposing, they considered
religion a matter best reserved to the states and one over which
the national government should have no jurisdiction. We are
aware, after all, that many of those who were involved in the
proposal and adoption of the Constitution were profoundly interested in and sensitive to the issue of states’ rights. James Madison continually addressed the fears of those who believed that
the national government would swallow up state governments.
He wrote that “all those alarms which have been sounded, of a
meditated or consequential annihilation of the State Governments, must, on the most favorable interpretation, be ascribed to
the chimerical fears of the authors of them.”86 He highlighted, in
the same vein, that “each of the principal branches of the federal
Government will owe its existence more or less to the favor of the
State Governments, and must consequently feel a dependence,
which is much more likely to beget a disposition too obsequious,
than too overbearing towards them.”87
Madison’s tone was categorical and his point unmistakable
as he tirelessly underscored that the jurisdiction of the proposed
federal government “extends to certain enumerated objects only,
and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects.”88 Not only Madison, but also many
men of the time, like George Mason,89 James Wilson,90 and Samuel Bryan,91 spoke in the most serious and solemn tones about
the issue of states’ rights. So why is it not plausible to conclude,
86 THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison), in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 14, pt. 2, at 116.
87 THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison), in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 14, pt. 2, at 104.
88 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison), in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 14, pt. 2, at 31.
89 See George Mason Fears for the Rights of the People, in THE DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, pt. 2, at 605. Mason states that the power of the “General
Government” to tax the states directly is “totally subversive of every principle which has
hitherto governed us” and “is calculated to annihilate totally the State Governments.” Id.
90 See James Wilson’s Speech at a Public Meeting, in THE DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, pt. 1, at 67. Wilson assures his listeners that “it is evidently absurd to suppose . . . that the annihilation of the State governments will result
from their union.” Id. Later, in the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, he described
the driving principle of federalism as follows: “whatever object was confined in its nature
and operation to a particular State, ought to be subject to the separate government of the
States, but whatever in its nature and operation extended beyond a particular State,
ought to be comprehended within the F[e]deral jurisdiction.” James Wilson’s Opening
Address, in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, pt. 1, at 796.
91 See Reply to Wilson’s Speech: “Centinel” [Samuel Bryan] II, in THE DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, pt. 1, at 80. Bryan responds to Wilson’s initial speech and
asserts that he “has recourse to the most flimsey sophistry in his attempt to refute the
charge that the new plan of general government will supersede and render powerless the
state governments.” Id.

299-358 SMITH.DOC

2006]

5/30/2007 9:58:56 PM

Does God Belong in American Public Life?

315

in contradistinction to the argument of Kramnick and Moore,
that the Founders may have regarded issues of religion as ones
which the states, and not the national government, should decide? In such light, would it not make sense that the nation’s patriarchs apparently felt no compulsion to cover ground that the
state constitutions had already covered?92 Kramnick and Moore
are curiously silent regarding the towering issue of federalism
that occupies, even on occasion monopolizes, the first debates regarding the Constitution.
2. A Reluctance to State the Obvious
Our authors further ignore a second likely and closely related inference. The Framers’ failure to reference God in the
Constitution may have amounted to little more than an expression of their desire not to address unnecessary issues. Consider
the manner in which Noah Webster engaged the argument, made
by those who opposed the Constitution, that there was no provision within it against a standing army during times of peace. His
words serve to enlighten us about why there is silence on particular subjects. He asks: “Why do not people object that no provision is made against the introduction of a body of Turkish Janizaries; or against making the Alcoran the rule of faith and
practice, instead of the Bible?”93 “The answer to such objections,”
he emphasizes, “is simply this—no such provision is necessary.”94
Webster explains that there is no provision against standing armies because “the principles and habits, as well as the power” of
the American people are opposed to them, and that “there is as
little necessity to guard against them by positive constitutions, as
to prohibit the establishment of the Mahometan religion.”95
Would taking Webster’s point seriously in this instance not readily suggest that the Founders’ failure to refer to God in the Constitution could have had to do with their reluctance to state the
obvious? This is certainly an inference no less viable than supposing that they intended to secularize American public life. One
may wonder that, if the latter had been their object, why they
92 The Massachusetts Constitution required the governor and legislators to believe
the “Christian religion.” The Maryland Constitution similarly required officeholders to
declare their “belief in the Christian religion.” The New Hampshire Constitution limited
senators to those of “the protestant religion.” Delaware’s oath of office required affirmation of the Trinity and the divine inspiration of the Old and New Testaments. North
Carolina required its officeholders to affirm the being of God, to profess the truth of Protestantism, to accept the divine authority of the Old and New Testaments, and not to hold
to any religious principle “incompatible with the freedom and safety of the State . . . .” See
THE FOUNDING FATHERS, supra note 49, at 250–51.
93 See Noah Webster, A Citizen of America, in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 14, pt. 1, at 150.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 151.
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proposed a Constitution that left the states free to do about religion what they wished.
3. No Justification for Ineffectual Provisions
Another reasonable inference not in keeping with the secularization thesis deserves mention. Jefferson once wrote that in
matters of religion, the effect of coercion was “[t]o make one half
the world fools, and the other half hypocrites.”96 The point was
not lost on the Founders nor on those who debated the adoption
of the Constitution. Oliver Ellsworth observed that it is easy for
“an unprincipled man”97 to take an oath or to declare his belief in
a creed and then to justify himself for not comporting himself in
accordance with it. Requirements such as religious oaths and
tests tend to bind only the person whose virtue binds him anyway; they in no way safeguard the body politic from and screen
out the disreputable opportunist who lies and takes the oath or
test insincerely. “In short,” Ellsworth maintained, “test-laws are
utterly ineffectual.”98 James Iredell made the same point when
he opined in North Carolina’s ratification convention that religious oaths do not fulfill their purpose.99 Why incorporate a wellmeaning, albeit ineffectual, requirement into the Constitution?
It comprises nothing short of a quantum leap in logic to conclude
the failure to do so ipso facto suggests that the Founders’ goal
was to secularize American public life.
4. The Overarching Point
While the Constitution contains no substantive reference to
God and no positive reference to religion, it is prudent to exercise
caution when interpreting these facts. They do not in and of
themselves demonstrate an antipathy to public expressions of religion, nor do they reveal skepticism regarding the idea of God.
One need not conclude that they illustrate the Founders’ desire
to create an entirely secular state. Such facts allow a variety of
inferences, some of which are incompatible with Kramnick’s and
Moore’s thesis, such as those set forth above.
B. Roger Williams and John Locke
1. Roger Williams’s View of Separation
If the separation of church and state is interpreted to mean
that the latter is to be a thoroughly secular sphere, then the ap96
97
98
99

at 904.

JEFFERSON, supra note 53, at 283, 286.
Ellsworth, supra note 16, at 523.
Id. at 524.
Henry Abbot and James Iredell Debate the Ban on Religious Tests, supra note 19,
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peal to Roger Williams is in vain. According to one scholar, Williams “had no argument with making God’s will supreme in public as well as in private life.”100 His dispute was with the manner
in which the Puritans in Massachusetts were attempting to do it.
He emphasized that civil magistrates should not seek to interpose their will upon church affairs by forcing another under
threat of legal penalty to obey commands, which come as a “direct call from God.”101 But he was also insistent that God should
not be left out of the affairs of state. He asserted that civil peace
arises and is maintained from not only civil laws, but also “true
religion.”102 He declared: “Civil peace cannot stand entire where
religion is corrupted.”103
Since Williams’s emphasis upon separation was not his way
of shielding the state from the influence of the church and of religion, how may his notion of separation be characterized? It
was, for him, the means of protecting the individual’s right of
conscience, while simultaneously safeguarding the purity of the
church and of “true religion.” He was haunted by the specter of a
pure and righteous Christian believer, who desired nothing more
than to reside within a “garden” fashioned by God that is separated and walled off from the “wilderness” of the world, being molested by civil authorities and forced at the point of sword to confess false beliefs.104 There are admittedly points of overlap
between Williams’s view of separation as a quest for religious purity and Kramnick’s and Moore’s view of it as advocacy for a godless state and politics, but the two visions differ radically from
each other in their underlying assumptions, motivation, and ultimate objective. To conflate them is to misunderstand both.
2. John Locke’s View of Separation
Locke, as revealed in his Letter of Toleration, did not speak
of church and state so much in terms of being separate spheres
as of being different ones.105 Aside from this fact, his view of
100 JERALD C. BRAUER, PROTESTANTISM IN AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 33 (1965),
available at http://www.religion-online.org/showchapter.asp?title=1663&C=1656.
101 Id.
102 WILLIAMS, supra note 26, at 153.
103 Id.
104 See PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 38–51 (2002) [hereinafter SEPARATION], in which Hamburger argues that Williams adopted “the wall of
separation” metaphor as an image of purity which he sought in religion.
105 See TOLERATION, supra note 42, at 27, where the author states that church is “a
thing absolutely separate and distinct from the commonwealth.” Compare and contrast
this statement with the way in which Locke distinguishes the two elsewhere in this work:
e.g., civil government is concerned with the outward, while religion the inward, id. at 18;
civil government is restricted to the things of the temporal world, while religion with
those in the world to come, id. at 20; civil government is a public matter, whereas religion
is a private, personal one, id. at 28–31; civil government enforces its precepts with penal-
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separation is a narrow one. It rests upon his minimalist conception that the raison d’etre of the state is the protection of life, liberty, and property. Because the public realm of government is
limited, the private and personal realm of religion is expansive.
As the tentacles of government now reach deeper into people’s
lives than they did under Locke’s theory, his view of separation is
increasingly inapplicable, if not impossible. The advent of the
welfare state, in other words, has rendered his notion of separation archaic and hard to square with the present.
So for commentators like Kramnick and Moore to call upon
the classical liberalism of Locke in order to defend their regime of
secularizing the current welfare state is confused and disingenuous from the start. The essential condition for Locke’s view of the
separation of church and state is a minimalist state. Without
that, the jurisdiction of the state eventually consumes that of the
church, rendering it powerless. Assuming that the state is a godless sphere, then godlessness will predominate throughout society as the state increases. Locke’s political philosophy does not
support such an outcome. He was not by any stretch of the
imagination the secularist that Kramnick and Moore are and can
hardly be relied upon to support their argument.
Our authors should not regard Locke’s view of separation as
helpful to their defense of the secular state for other notable reasons. The leading rationale for a secular state is toleration, but
Locke’s view of separation does not lend itself to the wholehearted promotion of that virtue. In Locke’s view, all religious
beliefs are not equally deserving of protection. Beliefs that are
subversive to the state should never be protected.106 Nor should
those religious beliefs that undermine the foundations of human
society.107 What is more, a church in which communicants owe
their allegiance to another prince, (and here some think that he
was referring specifically to Roman Catholics although he explains that the reference is to Islam),108 cannot be tolerated.109
Atheists likewise have no place in Locke’s state.110 The point is
that his view of the separation of church and state is quite narrow and is as influenced by religion as it is separated from it. To
phrase the observation another way, Locke’s is a political point of
view that provides freedom of religion, but no freedom from it.
ties, but religion relies only upon the light of reason and evidence, id. at 19; and civil government is concerned with life, liberty, and property, whereas religion is concerned with
the salvation of souls, id. at 17.
106 Id. at 50.
107 Id.
108 Patrick Romanell, Introduction to TOLERATION, supra note 42, at 10.
109 TOLERATION, supra note 42, at 51.
110 Id. at 52.
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To correlate this position with Kramnick’s and Moore’s is possible
perhaps, but only if one takes a broad leap of abstraction and
turns a blind eye to what Locke specifically taught.
3. Summary Observation
Here again, it is imprudent to invoke, as Kramnick and
Moore have done, the views of Roger Williams and John Locke in
order to defend the secular state. While there are, between these
icons and our authors, certain similarities and points of agreement, they are far from conclusive and ultimately convince only
those who are already convinced of the secularist position.
C. Thomas Jefferson and the Secular State
1. The Celebrated “Wall”
The most egregious mistake that Kramnick and Moore make
is that they, in a less than critical fashion, enlist Jefferson in
support of their thesis and interpret his correspondence with the
Danbury Baptists as an illustration of his dedication to the notion of the secular state.
One must first remember that the third President was indeed a devoted disciple of Locke. He believed that the best government was a minimal one.111 The national government was,
for him, properly limited; there were undertakings that were
permitted to it, but many others that were not. It was, with respect to religion, distinguishable from state governments and ecclesiastical institutions.112 States were free to engage in religious
activities, and Jefferson had no problem with that idea.113 He
had even issued a thanksgiving proclamation while he was governor of Virginia.114 Furthermore, as a member of the Virginia
House of Burgesses, he had participated in the drafting and enactment of a resolution calling for a day of fasting, humiliation,
and prayer.115 Daniel L. Driesbach perceptively concludes, therefore, that “[t]he ‘wall’ metaphor was not offered as a general pronouncement on the prudential relationship between religion and
all civil government; rather, it was, more specifically, a statement delineating the legitimate constitutional jurisdictions of the
federal and state governments on matters pertaining to relig-

See GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 70.
THOMAS JEFFERSON, Second Inaugural Address (March 4, 1805) para. 7, reprinted
in WRITINGS, supra note 53, at 518, 519–20 [hereinafter Second Inaugural].
113 See id.
114 DANIEL L. DRIESBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 58–59 (2002) [hereinafter JEFFERSON AND THE WALL].
115 Id. at 56.
111
112
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ion.”116 The letter to the Danbury Baptists, in short, served a political purpose: it was a way by which the President could swipe
at John Adams and other Federalists who, during the malicious
1800 presidential campaign, had been suspected of supporting
the establishment of a national church.117
2. Jefferson and Public Religion
Kramnick’s and Moore’s depiction of Jefferson’s views border
upon caricature. His statements and actions were far more complex than these authors portray. Aside from his conviction that
states were free to engage in religious observances, Jefferson
nonetheless could bend his own philosophy a bit in the national
arena. When the Reverend John Leland, who had been instrumental in disestablishing the Anglican Church in Virginia, came
to Washington approximately a year after Jefferson initially took
office as President, Leland not only presented the President with
a mammoth cheese weighing twelve hundred and thirty-five
pounds,118 but also preached in the Hall of the House of Representatives the following Sunday.119 Jefferson, a mere two days
after writing his letter to the Danbury Baptists in which he advanced his famous metaphor, appeared in the House to hear
Leland preach. Jefferson’s listening to Leland’s sermon in this
context did not represent a sudden break from his usual practice,
since he had attended worship services on public property before
becoming President.120 He would likewise attend public religious
services throughout his Presidency.121 In a similar vein, during
his Second Inaugural Address, Jefferson confessed his need for
“the favor of that Being in whose hands we are, who led our forefathers, as Israel of old, from their native land, and planted them
in a country flowing with all the necessaries and comforts of
life,”122 and he invited his countrymen “to join with me in supplications, that he will so enlighten the minds of your servants,
guide their councils, and prosper their measures, that whatsoever they do, shall result in your good, and shall secure to you
the peace, friendship, and approbation of all nations.”123 These
are all indications that Kramnick and Moore may have painted
an oversimplified picture.

116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

Id. at 60.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Second Inaugural, supra note 112, at para. 15.
Id.
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3. Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom
There is no question that this statute, which was inspired by
Jefferson, disestablished religion in the state of Virginia. It represented a milestone of libertarian accomplishment. No longer
would religion be enforced by coercive means. No one would
thereafter be compelled to support religious worship or, for that
matter, any instrumentality of religion. Yet it cannot go unnoticed that the first protracted sentence of the bill reads, in some
respects, like a confession of faith. The sentence refers to “Almighty God,” to “his supreme will,” and to “the plan of the holy
author of our religion, who being lord both of body and mind.”124
The question that immediately comes to mind is whether the Bill
demonstrates a conviction regarding disestablishment or one regarding separation. If the latter, then why the weighty religious
references? Would Kramnick and Moore argue that these references are secular? Does the statute really, as they claim, amount
to a “comprehensive call for a total separation of church and
state,”125 or is this characterization simply another indication of
their inclination to exaggerate and to accentuate only a part of
the evidence?
4. Separation versus Disestablishment
Indeed, when one examines the writings of leading eighteenth century Americans, men like Patrick Henry, Samuel Adams, Isaac Backus, George Mason, John Adams, Caleb Wallace,
John Leland, Oliver Ellsworth, and George Washington, who are
frequently thought to have subscribed to the secular theory of
“separation of church and state,” only the most meager evidence
surfaces in favor of the theory.126 Most of these persons do not so
much as even use the word “separation” or any of its derivatives.
There is a strong and viable argument one can make that these
icons in American history supported disestablishment, which was
not for them a notion synonymous with separation.127
124 2 THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in THE PAPERS
THOMAS JEFFERSON 545–46 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950), reprinted in ROBERT T. MILLER
& RONALD B. FLOWERS, TOWARD BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY: CHURCH, STATE, AND THE
SUPREME COURT app. A, at 584–85 (3d ed. 1987).
125 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 92.
126 See SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 7. I would challenge the
reader to examine each of the selections in this work and to discover for him or herself the
truth of my observation that the founders rarely, if ever, advocate “separation.” One discovers in most of these writings an opposition to forced religion or to laws pertaining to
worship, along with a commensurate favoring of the view that religious freedom is an inalienable right over which civil authorities have no power. But one does not find these
men advocating the notion of separation or of a “godless” public life.
127 This observation is generally in agreement with the observation of Hamburger,
who describes the doctrine of separation as primarily a phenomenon of the nineteenth
century. See SEPARATION, supra note 104, at 78, 111. The observation also agrees with
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5. Closing Observation about Jefferson
There is significant evidence to suggest that Jefferson did
not favor a secular public sphere of the sort that Kramnick and
Moore envision and support. My purpose here, however, is not to
state whether he did or did not do so, but simply to demonstrate
that these authors do not convincingly prove their point about
the third President. Appeals to Jefferson’s beliefs and practices
can militate as easily against a godless state as in favor of one.
6. The Subversion of the Secular Ideal
Madison supported the appointment of congressional chaplains when he served in the House of Representatives.128 He also,
during his Presidency, proclaimed a national day of public humiliation and prayer.129 There is evidence that, after he left office, he came to regard both actions as violations of the Establishment Clause and as deviations from the godless
Constitution.130 The matter appears finally to boil down to a
choice of whether to agree with the public or the private Madison. This choice resembles a leap into darkness, for there are no
magical, brightly illuminated guideposts pointing one to the definitive meaning of the Establishment Clause. Yet the burden of
proof, it should be remembered, is usually shouldered by the one
whose thesis is under consideration. When Kramnick and Moore
argue that Madison’s religious proclamation was retrogressive
and outside the orbit of the Establishment Clause, their assessment is based upon little more than a body of checkered evidence
that just as readily lends itself to the opposite point of view.
Furthermore, when these authors describe the introduction
of religious beliefs into the national currency, the movement and
delivery of the mail, and the national Pledge of Allegiance as unthe analysis of Daniel Dreisbach, who points out that New England Baptists (like Isaac
Backus and John Leland) did not regard “separation” and “nonestablishment” as interchangeable. See JEFFERSON AND THE WALL, supra note 114, at 51.
128 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 104–05 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). Compare GODLESS
CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 105, where the authors state that Madison “also opposed,
unsuccessfully, the appointing of chaplains to Congress.” The statement glosses over the
fact that Madison did not apparently oppose the action while he was in Congress.
129 If the issuance of the proclamation was a mistake as Kramnick and Moore argue,
it was one that President Madison continued to make. He issued such proclamations
throughout his Presidency. See 1 JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789–1897, at 513, 532–33, 558, 560–61
(1896).
130 See James Madison, A Detached Memorandum, in SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE, supra note 7, at 138, 141. In this writing, Madison stated that the appointment of
chaplains for institutions of state “shut the door of worship [against] the members whose
creeds and consciences forbid a participation in [the religion] of the majority.” Id. at 139.
He maintained that “[r]eligious proclamations by the Executive recommending thanksgivings & fasts are shoots from the same root . . . .” Id. at 141.
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dermining the godless Constitution and the secular state, one
must ask when and by whom such a standard of measurement
was ever conclusively established. Kramnick and Moore certainly have not established it. Unless and until godlessness in
public life becomes the proven and/or accepted standard, episodes
of religious expression in American public life undermine nothing.
If those like Robert Bellah131 and Sidney Mead132 are correct,
there has always been a religious dimension in American public
life. Whether one refers to this aspect of the country’s communal
existence as a “civil religion”133 is not really important. What
Bellah and Mead suggest is that there is a wellspring of national
spirituality, which in turn involves a belief in a deity. Assuming
that one agrees with them on this score, as many do,134 the very
episodes that Kramnick and Moore decry as departures from the
standard, other commentators might applaud as reflective of it.
E. Conclusion of Analysis
It appears doubtful whether any historical inquiry into this
matter will ever render an uncontested verdict. To expect another outcome would be naïve. Thus, for an answer to the queries of who determined the standard as well as how and when
they did so, we must turn our attention elsewhere.
III. SECULARIZATION AND THE SUPREME COURT
A.

The Completed Revolution

One may at this juncture wish to ask, “Why, when the historical evidence in favor of a secular state is checkered and far
less than conclusive, do we have a secular state, or a public
131 See ROBERT N. BELLAH, THE BROKEN COVENANT: AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION IN
TIME OF TRIAL 12 (1975); and Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, in BEYOND
BELIEF: ESSAYS ON RELIGION IN A POST-TRADITIONALIST WORLD 168, 168–69 (Univ. of
California Press 1991) (1970) [hereinafter Civil Religion].
132 See SIDNEY E. MEAD, THE LIVELY EXPERIMENT: THE SHAPING OF CHRISTIANITY IN
AMERICA 38–50 (1963) [hereinafter LIVELY EXPERIMENT].
133 See Civil Religion, supra note 131, at 168. See also JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU,
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 176–87 (M. Cranston trans., Penguin Books 1968) (1762), where
the author is the first to have used the term.
134 See, for example, THE FOUNDING FATHERS, supra note 49, at 282 (quoting JOHNJACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 131 (Roger D. Masters ed., Judith R. Masters trans., St. Martin’s Press 1978) (1762)), in which Lambert writes the following:
Many other Americans professed Christianity but, like Jefferson, embraced a
civil religion that excluded or ignored many tenets central to Christian orthodoxy. Jefferson, Adams, Washington, Franklin, and Hamilton all expressed
some version of what Rousseau called “civil religion”: a belief in “the existence
of a powerful, intelligent, beneficent, foresighted, and providential divinity; the
afterlife; the happiness of the just; the punishment of the wicked; [and] the
sanctity of the social contract.”
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sphere closely resembling one?”135 The answer is that there has
already been a successfully executed “secular revolution”136 in
this country. It was, except for some of its details, completed by
the turn of the twentieth century and involved virtually every
aspect of American culture, including but not limited to education, the natural sciences, and law.137 The insurgents, comprising the nation’s intelligentsia, embraced naturalism, materialism, positivism, and the privatization, if not extinction, of
religion.138 They rebelliously gave birth to a novel social paradigm in this country that embodied their modes of thought and
that soon came to dominate American public life.
Current culture skirmishes, which have been recently evidenced, may perhaps be interpreted as little more than a bothersome footnote to the culture war that has already been fought
and won. But such skirmishes may also signal a new counterinsurgency, which is uneasy about the direction of American public life under a secular paradigm and ready to mount its overthrow.
1. Education
For more than five hundred years in Western Civilization,
135 The observation of Stephen B. Presser is correct. He reviews Kramnick’s and
Moore’s book and states: “There is more than a little that is curious about this book, because its breathlessly-advanced thesis, that ours is a ‘Godless Constitution,’ now seems to
be the well-established view of a majority of members of the United States Supreme
Court.” Stephen B. Presser, Some Realism about Atheism: Responses to The Godless Constitution, 1 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 87, 89–90 (1997) (reviewing ISAAC KRAMNICK AND R.
LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION (1996)). The curiosity really concerns the
Court. Why does it tend to favor secularization when an examination of the early history
of the Republic on the matter of church-state relations does not lead ineluctably to the
conclusion that secularization must be favored?
136 See Christian Smith, Introduction to THE SECULAR REVOLUTION, at 1–4 (Christian
Smith ed., Univ. of California Press 2003) [hereinafter SECULAR REVOLUTION], in which
he uses and defends this term.
137 Even Protestantism itself became a secularizing influence. Its Holy Scriptures
were interpreted through the lens of the discipline of psychology. See Keith G. Meador,
“My Own Salvation”: The Christian Century and Psychology’s Secularizing of American
Protestantism, in SECULAR REVOLUTION, supra note 134, at 269, 296, where the author,
describing the first few decades of Protestantism during the twentieth century, states
that “parts of American Protestantism were becoming difficult to distinguish from the
secular alternative of psychology, and many American Protestants began to forego traditional religious practices entirely in favor of a more direct alleviation of suffering from the
psychologists, whom even churches hailed as the true ‘physicians of the soul.’” Charles
Clayton Morrison, the first editor of the Christian Century, wrote retrospectively with regret in 1939 of the breakdown of his religious belief system in the immediate aftermath of
the secular revolution: “Its [i.e., any religious phenomenon’s] objectivity as something
given to me from beyond myself, had been reduced to my own subjective processes.” Id. at
297 (quoting How My Mind Has Changed, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Nov. 8, 1939, at 1370,
1371). Morrison’s progressive brand of Christianity had brought him to an ideological
place respecting religion the same as or similar to that of scientists, educators, and law
professors.
138 Christian Smith, Introduction to THE SECULAR REVOLUTION, supra note 136, at 1.

299-358 SMITH.DOC

2006]

5/30/2007 9:58:56 PM

Does God Belong in American Public Life?

325

the Christian Church was in charge of education.139 Throughout
seventeenth-, eighteenth-, and most of nineteenth-century America, the Church’s role in education predominated over all others.
Harvard, Yale, William & Mary, and Princeton were established
as religious institutions, the primary purpose of which was to
produce and to train clergy.140 Most American colleges established during this time were the work of Christian denominations, and so, naturally, their clergy possessed both teaching and
administrative responsibilities in these educational institutions.141 By the end of the nineteenth century, clergy involvement in colleges and universities had declined.142 Higher education was, by then, no longer under the control of the Church.
A large part of this turn of events is explicable in terms of
European modes of thought that began flourishing approximately
a century earlier. Immanuel Kant propounded his critical philosophy in Germany during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. He distinguished between empirical knowledge
and faith. The former was related to the world of sense perception and had to do with mathematical and physical science. The
latter was unbounded by sense and had to do with the movements of the mind. Although Kant correlated the notions of God,
freedom, and immortality with morality, it was clear that, for
him, these and other moral ideas and maxims possessed a cognitive status fundamentally different from those of science. He
limited knowledge, he professed, to make room for faith. It was
this dichotomy of knowledge and faith that was of immense significance for the secular revolution.
Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer, who followed Kant in
the nineteenth century, built upon this dichotomy, each in his
own way. Comte envisioned a progression in human knowledge,
with the mind passing first through a theological stage, followed
by a metaphysical one, and then attaining its fullest flower in the
ideal of positivism, which he maintained is exemplified by natural science. No longer should one attempt to explain phenomena
by resorting to the realm of the supernatural (theology) or to
causal forces inherent within phenomena (metaphysics). Science
of the kind that occupied Galileo, Kepler, and Newton is concerned with providing explanations, based upon observation, of
the relations between observable facts. Positivism, then, for
Comte, has to do with real, certain, and exact knowledge, which
139 Christian Smith, Secularizing
REVOLUTION, supra note 136, at 97.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 97–101.
142 Id. at 101.
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embodies mathematics, natural sciences, and sociology.
Spencer accepted the proposition that there is a realm of experience and a realm not experienced. The latter realm is the
one properly associated with religious belief, which cannot be
tested or quantified empirically. Theism, pantheism, and atheism all fail for the same reason: they cannot be related to or correlated with experience. Agnosticism, according to Spencer, is
the only viable option religiously and metaphysically. Spencer
also rejected all theological systems and was equally critical of
the religious institutions promulgating them.
Christian Smith stresses the heavy impact of Comte and
Spencer upon American academicians and higher education. He
writes, “Both [thinkers] provided what proved to be key intellectual tools utilized by rising academic elites seeking to displace religious authority in order to make room for themselves as new,
secular cultural authorities.”143
Smith also points out that, during the nineteenth century,
over ten thousand American scholars studied at German universities, the most secularized institutions in the world at the time,
and brought back to this country German idealism, historicism,
and rationalism,144 each of which was opposed, if not outrightly
hostile, to a traditionally religious worldview. Academic faculty
members, like John Dewey145 who had thoroughly immersed himself in Kant’s philosophy and Hegelian idealism, resented any
parochial or sectarian standard in education and thought of religion as belonging only to one’s personal and private life. Such
academicians fought for what they perceived as intellectual
autonomy, opposing the denominational grip on higher education
that was at its tightest during the 1880s and 90s.146
In addition, institutions like Harvard, Johns Hopkins, and
Cornell were under the leadership of Charles Eliot, Daniel Coit
Gilman, and Andrew Dickson White, respectively, all of whom
were educational reformers who worked assiduously to marginalize religion in the academic curriculum and to further what they
were convinced was genuine knowledge.147
Aside from the above-described ideological shift, the nineteenth century saw the flourishing of capitalism, which fueled
secularization. Corporate capitalism was not interested in classi143 Christian Smith, Secularizing
REVOLUTION, supra note 136, at 97, 101.
144 Id. at 101–02.
145 Id. at 103.
146 Id. at 102–03.
147 Id. at 103.
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cally-educated students, but in those who were trained in business, law, engineering, and the material sciences; in those who
could, in short, generate capital.148 As Smith puts it, “[c]apitalism thus undercut the justification for the scholarly task of a college system that privileged religious knowledge in its education,
bolstering instead a rationale for a kind of technical, instrumental scholarship that was at the very least indifferent to religious
concerns and interests.”149 Secular research universities soon
began to supplant denominational colleges as the dominant institutions of higher education.150
The marginalization of religion in higher education soon
characterized the local public schools as well. During the middle
of the nineteenth century, educators like Horace Mann were outspokenly in favor of religious instruction in public schools.151
They believed, like James Pyle Wickersham once did, that
“[s]chools in this country should train the young to be religious.”152 But, by the mid-1870s and 80s, the National Education
Association (NEA), which had become membered with those of a
secular mindset, went on the attack against teaching religion,
i.e., a common Protestant Christianity, in public schools.153 Educational elites, consisting of many local school superintendents as
well as faculty and administrators of many major universities,
joined the NEA and worked to remove religion from public
schools.154 William Torrey Harris, superintendent of schools in
St. Louis, Missouri, was one of those who fervently opposed religious teaching in public schools and became a fierce advocate for
secular public education.155
By the beginning of the twentieth century, only hints of the
old religious system remained in public schools. It had been a political struggle, Kraig Beyerlein maintains, and “the educational
secularizers in the [NEA] had won.”156
2. Science
Secularization in the sciences unfolded during the nineteenth century as a conflict between positivism and Baconian-

Christian Smith, Introduction, in SECULAR REVOLUTION, supra note 136, at 76.
Id.
Kraig Beyerlein, Educational Elites and the Movement to Secularize Public Education, in SECULAR REVOLUTION, supra note 136, at 160, 176.
151 Id. at 163.
152 Id. at 165 (emphasis omitted) (quoting NTA Proceedings 606 (1866)).
153 Id. at 169.
154 Id. at 170.
155 Id. at 174–75.
156 Id. at 193.
148
149
150
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ism.157 The primary goal of the latter was to gather facts through
close, honest, and refined observation.158 The idea of Baconianism was that, as taxonomy grew, it would demonstrate the universal laws of God.159 Yet just as facts came through observation,
they could also be received from God through revelation.160 According to Baconian science, science and religion were two sides
of the very same coin.161 There was a “permeable boundary” between the two.162
Men like Herbert Spencer, Charles Darwin, and Thomas
Huxley were stalwart representatives of the positivist approach
to scientific pursuit.163 They flatly rejected Baconian premises.
Religion, for them, had nothing to do with science; thus, the
clergy had no right to speak with authority regarding scientific
questions.
Edward L. Youmans, a personal friend and disciple of
Spencer as well as an evolutionist, thought that it was time to
disseminate positivist ideas on a popular basis. Popular Science
Monthly was Youmans’s brainchild. He prevailed upon William
Henry Appleton, of publishing fame, to underwrite the publication.164 It sold at least eleven thousand copies a month and became the leading purveyor of popular scientific ideas during the
last part of the nineteenth century.165
The various authors featured in this periodical, as well as in
other periodicals such as Scientific American, declared war on
biblical literalism.166 Scripture, they argued, resembled poetry
and art more than science,167 and widespread religious claims
demonstrate at best that humans possess spiritual faculties
which generate such claims.168 The result of such arguments
against religion resulted in a slow, but devastating erosion of Baconianism’s credibility. The religious texts to which it subscribed
came to be viewed by many as nothing more than an artistic accomplishment169 and certainly not as a source of scientific truth.
157 Eva Marie Garroutte, The Positivist Attack on Baconian Science and Religious
Knowledge in the 1870s, in SECULAR REVOLUTION, supra note 136, at 197.
158 Id. at 198.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 199.
161 See id. (commenting on the Baconian view that science (nature) and religion (the
biblical text) are “complementary and absolutely noncontradictory,” and that “scientists
and theologians could apply the very same scientific method to the study of both”).
162 Id. at 200.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 201.
166 Id. at 204.
167 Id. at 205.
168 Id. at 206.
169 Id. at 205.
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Later, as the subjectivity of language surfaced as a major problem in hermeneutics, criticism rose to a new height when such
commentators expressed the idea that perhaps the words of
Scripture were more about the thoughts of those who had written, and were presently interpreting, them than about the mind
of deity.170 The upshot of the matter was that positivists urged
devotees of religion “to abandon the delusion that they possess
facts”171 and to withdraw from scientific discourse, especially
when they have their Bibles in hand.
By attacking the religious basis of Baconian science, the
positivists had “made themselves the sole inheritors of the right
to control the intellectual territory from which they had successfully displaced religious interests.”172 This accomplishment did
not go unnoticed, but “reverberated through most other instituHenceforth, scientific
tional fields in American society.”173
knowledge would be king of the realm, while religious claims
would be relegated to virtual irrelevancy.
3. Law
The secularization of law was a drama that unfolded in two
major parts. The first pitted the “science of law” movement, represented by men such as Christopher Langdell, Samuel Williston,
and Jeremiah Smith, against a jurisprudence in which community and religious notions of justice were creatively incorporated
into common law.174 The science of law protagonists were struggling, as the name of their movement indicates, to define law as
“science.”175 Science, after all, had become the gold standard for
knowledge. The champions of this new legal movement were law
professors, who desired to view themselves as scientists and purveyors of knowledge. Their laboratories were none other than
law schools that were located in or near the universities where
they taught.176
The second part of the drama was cast as a conflict between
so-called legal realists,177 like Oliver Wendell Holmes, John
Id. at 207–08.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 213.
Id.
David Sikkink, From Christian Civilization to Individual Civil Liberties, in
SECULAR REVOLUTION, supra note 136, at 310.
175 Id. at 314. The author writes that “the classical reformers [those in the science of
law movement] pursued a science of law that was meant to parallel botany or other physical sciences.” Id.
176 Those representing the science of law were also convinced that “a university, and
a university alone, can furnish every possible facility for teaching and learning” legal science. Id at 315 (internal quotation marks omitted).
177 See id. at 334.
See also JURISPRUDENCE: TEXTS AND READINGS ON THE
170
171
172
173
174
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Chipman Gray, and Roscoe Pound on the one hand, and formalists, like advocates of the science of law such as Langdell178 on
the other. The legal realists insisted that law was an organic
phenomenon, the study of which could not be divorced from political and social fact. Law was not, as the formalists believed,
about the meticulous gathering and organization of principles
from legal reporters, because this approach undermined its nature as a living, breathing reality always shaped in a particular
social context.
The winners of the first struggle were those representing the
science of law. David Sikkink emphasizes that they succeeded in
“delegitimating the religious basis for legal decision making.”179
They attacked the jurisprudence of the heart and its appeal to religion, substituting for it the “pure gaze of the scientific law professor.”180
But these legal reformers were not altogether dismissive of
religion. The law, they insisted, must be “discovered.” It therefore possessed a transcendent aspect; it was as if they claimed a
“direct line to God’s mind through their knowledge of the principles of legal science.”181 But they were comfortable speaking only
of “general religion” or “general Christianity.”182 Although theirs
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (George C. Christie ed. 1973). Christie states that “legal realism”
possesses the following four characteristics: (1) a desire to separate law from morality in
legal analysis, (2) a distrust of legal formalism, i.e., deducing legal conclusions from rules
of law, (3) a suspicion of all legal generalizations along with the desire to break them
down into smaller units, and (4) a belief in the instrumental work that law can accomplish in society. Id. at 641–42. I use the term “legal realism” very broadly to include not
only Holmes, Gray, and Pound, but also sociological jurisprudes like Louis Brandeis, Benjamin Cardozo, Karl Llewellyn, Felix Cohen, and Jerome Frank.
178 Langdell was dean of the Harvard Law School and initiated the “case method”
system of instruction. This method, still followed in law schools today,
rested on the concept that the law could be scientized as neatly and efficiently
as chemistry or biology. If one could isolate gases, observe their properties,
and draw conclusions from which scientific principles could be developed, one
ought to be able to bring the same logic to legal precedents, reach back into
time for the earliest applicable cases and trace their progress, observe the
properties of each, and from them develop constant legal principles . . . .
LIVA BAKER, THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES 208 (1991). Holmes, convinced that law could not be properly studied divorced
from pertinent political and social realities, despised “case method” instruction, thought it
largely worthless, and stayed in law school only a year. Id. at 208–09. See also JEROME
FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 226 (1949), where he quotes Langdell, saying: “What qualifies a
person to teach law . . . is not experience in the work of a lawyer’s office, not experience in
dealing with men, not experience in the trial or argument of causes, not experience, in
short, in using law, but experience in learning law. . . . ”
179 David Sikkink, From Christian Civilization to Individual Civil Liberties, in
SECULAR REVOLUTION, supra note 136, at 316.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 316–17. In Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892), the
Supreme Court referred to this country as “a Christian nation.” But the reference, it
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was not “that good old-time religion,” it was nevertheless one
that molded character and conformed to the dictates of a general
morality.183
The winners of the second struggle were the legal realists.
They were convinced that judges did not discover law, but were
policymakers who create it.184 Holmes, who was representative
of the group, argued that “[t]he ground of [a judicial] decision
really comes down to a proposition of [social and political] policy.”185
He and other realists, like Louis Brandeis and Benjamin
Cardozo, were also empiricists to the core. They were more impressed by social and political differences than by unities and
similarities. Holmes believed, according to one biographer, that
the “truth was only what he couldn’t help thinking on the basis of
observation and experience, and his only absolute was an absolute abhorrence of absolutes.”186 There were, for him, no eternal
guideposts in law that imparted to it a transcendent dimension.
It was and is located in a sea of relativism and, in the final
analysis, is a product of human construction.
Needless to say, Holmes was, in terms of religious faith, an
agnostic. There was little room in his judicial philosophy for a
belief in God.187 Law was, in his view, separate and distinct from
religion and morality, and simply “embodies the story of a nation’s development through many centuries.”188
His attack on legal formalism began in the nineteenth century, but rolled onward, gathering momentum with new and
powerful voices, through most of the twentieth century. The
eventual demise of formalism thoroughly secularized law in
America. Religion—general or otherwise—no longer had a protected place in this country’s public life. The autonomy of the inshould be noted, is couched in general, as opposed to sectarian, terms. David Sikkink,
From Christian Civilization to Individual Civil Liberties, in SECULAR REVOLUTION, supra
note 136, at 318.
183 David Sikkink, From Christian Civilization to Individual Civil Liberties, in
SECULAR REVOLUTION, supra note 136, at 320.
184 Id. at 323.
185 Id. at 328 (quoting WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL
THOUGHT: LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886–1937, at 180 (1998)).
186 Id. at 327 (quoting LIVA BAKER, THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL: THE LIFE AND
TIMES OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 11 (1991)).
187 Id. at 324. Holmes was a well-read man, who had studied and been influenced by
both Comte and Spencer. See id. at 325. In Lochner v. New York, he wrote, “The 14th
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.” 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
188 David Sikkink, From Christian Civilization to Individual Civil Liberties, in
SECULAR REVOLUTION, supra note 136, at 327 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path
of the Law, 10 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 457–78 (1897)).
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dividual, along with the capitalization of individual civil rights,
came to the forefront in jurisprudence. One’s beliefs regarding
religion amounted to a private, individual right. The state’s function was to remain religion-neutral, while at the same time protecting those whose religious liberties were infringed.189
4. Summary Observation
It should not be overlooked that the Court’s emphasis upon
individual autonomy and state neutrality coincided with the
modes of thought of traditional liberalism. Just as the secularization of higher education ultimately owed a profound debt to
Kant190 as one of the primary architects of liberal thought, and
the secularization of science built upon the dichotomy in his
thought between empirical knowledge and faith, the secularization of law illustrated, first, the attempt to redefine itself as a
formalistic science so as to be regarded as a discipline of knowledge that was worthy of the university and, second, after this attempt failed, to cast itself as the means of safeguarding individual autonomy against collectivist forces, such as those of
religion, which were thought to militate against the spirit of the
individual. The secular revolution was one, in the final analysis,
about politics. It represented the triumph of political liberalism.
B.

Supreme Court Cases and Establishment Tests

Around the middle of the twentieth century, after the secular
revolution was already won and the brightest legal minds in the
country had effectively concluded that religion should have at
best a marginal role in American public life, the Supreme Court
received an opportunity to express its newfound sense of the relationship between religion and the state.191
1. Constitutionalizing the Wall
The question before the Court was whether a township in
New Jersey could, without violating the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment,192 tax its citizens for the costs of transporting children to church schools.193 Justice Black, speaking for the
majority of the Court, answered the question in the affirmative,
189 Elsewhere I have described the strong emphasis upon autonomy in the Court’s
interpretation of the Religion Clauses. See From Typology to Synthesis, supra note 81.
190 For a lengthy discussion of Kant’s liberalism and its influence upon jurisprudence,
see L. Scott Smith, Religion-Neutral Jurisprudence: An Examination of Its Meanings and
End, 13 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL 815, 823–39 (2005) [hereinafter “Religion-Neutral” Jurisprudence].
191 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
192 U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
193 Everson, 330 U.S. at 5.
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but in the course of doing so spelled out the meaning of the Establishment Clause as follows:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person
to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished
for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small,
can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect “a wall
of separation between church and State.”194

Justice Black emphasized that the individual is free to accept or to reject religious belief and that all governmental entities, whether local, state, or federal, must remain neutral, neither favoring nor disfavoring any religious persuasion.195 In
support of his opinion, Justice Black invoked not only Jefferson’s
celebrated metaphor of “a wall of separation,” but also “Virginia’s
Bill for Religious Liberty,” authored by the same patriot.
2. The Advent of the Lemon Test
In the cases that followed Everson, the Court declared unconstitutional a number of attempts by government to interject
religion into public life. Based upon such decisions, the Court
was able to formulate, almost a quarter of a century after Everson, what became known as the “Lemon test” for determining Establishment Clause violations. The test mandated that, in order
to pass scrutiny (1) a statute have a secular purpose, (2) there be
no evidence that the statute’s principal effect is to advance or to
inhibit religion, and (3) the statute not foster excessive entanglement between government and religion.196 The primary goal
of this three-pronged test was to ensure that religion and the affairs of state be separate from each other. Religion was relegated
to a private sphere of American life separate and distinct from
the public one, where issues of state are debated and decided and
its business is administered.197
Id. at 15–16.
Id. at 18.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
The following cases are but a few in which the Lemon test was applied: Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980), where the posting of the Ten Commandments in public
school classrooms was held to violate the Establishment Clause; Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38 (1985), where the authorization of a period of silence “for meditation or voluntary
194
195
196
197
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3. The Endorsement Test
Thereafter, Justice O’Connor, in a concurring opinion in
Lynch v. Donnelly,198 a case that involved whether a crèche displayed on public property in Pawtucket, Rhode Island during the
holiday season violated the Establishment Clause, suggested
that the Lemon test be modified and recast as an “endorsement
test.” According to Justice O’Connor, the question to ask, first
off, is whether the government intends by a specific practice to
convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion; secondly, whether the practice has the effect of communicating a
message of endorsement or disapproval of religion; and thirdly,
whether there is institutional entanglement between religion and
the government.199 This test was subsequently utilized by the
Court in County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh.200 It is
not appreciably different from the Lemon test in terms of attempting to insulate the state’s business from any expression of
religion. The goal was, at bottom, to safeguard the secular nature of all state endeavors, which are largely co-extensive with
American public life.
4. The Coercion Test
Subsequently, the Court in Lee v. Weisman,201 a case involving whether a rabbi offering a nonsectarian prayer at a school
commencement ceremony violated the Establishment Clause, advanced its “coercion test.” The Court explained that a state may
not place any student at a school-sponsored event in the position
of either participating in or protesting a religious activity. A person cannot, in short, be coerced; he or she cannot be made to feel
prayer” was held to violate the Establishment Clause; PEARL v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973), in which New York statutory amendments providing for (1) maintenance and repair of school facilities and equipment to insure the health, welfare and safety of pupils,
(2) a tuition grant program, and (3) a tax benefit program for those failing to qualify for
tuition reimbursement, and largely for the benefit of Roman Catholic schools and their
students were declared violations of the Establishment Clause; Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349 (1975), where sections of the Pennsylvania Public School Code were stricken
down as offenses against the Establishment Clause insofar as they provided instructional
material, equipment, and auxiliary services to parochial schools; Wolman v. Walter, 433
U.S. 229 (1977), in which an Ohio statute was held to violate the Establishment Clause by
providing instructional materials, equipment, and field trip expense to parochial schools;
and Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), in which a Louisiana statute providing
that there could be no teaching of the theory of evolution unless it was accompanied by
instruction in “creation science” was held a violation of the Establishment Clause.
198 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
199 Id. at 689–93 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
200 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding that a crèche displayed by itself on public premises is
a violation of the Establishment Clause).
201 505 U.S. 577 (1992). The Court followed Lee in Santa Fe v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290
(2000), in which the Court struck down a Texas school district’s policy of allowing a student chaplain to pray at school football games.

299-358 SMITH.DOC

2006]

5/30/2007 9:58:56 PM

Does God Belong in American Public Life?

335

like an outsider in an activity that is sponsored by an instrumentality of the state. The thrust of the coercion test was to defend
individual autonomy by protecting the secular character of any
activity in which the state is involved.202
5. The Historical Test
These three tests, whenever the Court desires, have been selectively used and then abandoned by it when considering establishment violations. A state act or practice can, rather mysteriously to some observers, be evaluated in terms of the antiquity of
the practice involved. The Court, for example, decided that the
Nebraska Legislature’s eighteen-year practice of hiring a Protestant clergyman to open each day’s legislative session with a
prayer was not contrary to the demands of religious freedom or
disestablishment.203 Such decisions left pundits wondering what
factors determined which test would be applicable in future contests. Predictability in Establishment Clause cases largely vanished and an apparent case by case approach fast became the
predominant rule, if there ever was one.204
Could it be that the Court’s wavering approach to the antiestablishment norm indicated a largely subjective jurisprudence
that was more concerned, in the spirit of Justice Holmes, with
charting political policy than with attempting to measure, according to the rationale of a Christopher Langdell, some supposed Constitutional truth? It is to the political implications of
the Court’s jurisprudence that we turn next.
IV. ANALYSIS
A.

Justice Black and the Everson Decision

1. Everson and the “Wall of Separation”
The Everson205 decision does not demonstrate the slightest
attempt to understand Jefferson’s correspondence with the Danbury Baptists, nor does the decision acknowledge any possible
differences between the meaning that Jefferson imparted to the
“wall of separation” and that which the Court gave to it. It appears that Justice Black appropriated the metaphor in a manner
that was not only foreign to the third President’s meaning and
purpose, but to his political philosophy as well.
Critics may hasten to observe that it is hardly remarkable

202
203
204
205

Lee, 505 U.S. at 588.
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 785–86 (1983).
From Typology to Synthesis, supra note 81, at 51–53.
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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for the Court, or for a Justice who has served on it, to make creative use of history and legal precedent in order to support or to
oppose any given point-of-view. That is correct, but before incorporating a metaphor into the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, is it too much to expect that a modest exegesis of
the metaphor’s meaning inform the endeavor?
When Jefferson utilized this phrase, there are numerous
reasons to suggest he was attempting to point out that the national government had no power over religious concerns. Baptists, who had been sadly persecuted in New England and elsewhere for their dissident beliefs, desired assurances from the
new President that he would support religious freedom and not
the establishment of a national church. Might it be that he was
attempting to give them this assurance in his now famous letter
and, again, in his Second Inaugural Address? In the latter, he
stated,
In matters of religion I have considered that its free exercise is
placed by the Constitution independent of the powers of the General
Government. I have therefore undertaken on no occasion to prescribe
the religious exercises suited to it, but have left them, as the Constitution found them, under the direction and discipline of the church or
state authorities acknowledged by the several religious societies.206

In view of such evidence, it is at best problematic to advocate
that Jefferson meant by the metaphor to propose a thoroughly
secular public life. He appeared to believe that the regulation of
religion was best left to the individual states and to religious institutions themselves.
I am not dogmatically urging that the meaning of Jefferson’s
letter to the Baptists is a settled one; it is an open question admitting of diverse historical judgments. One may even allow, for
the sake of argument and in accordance with the view of some
historians, that Justice Black’s appropriation of Jefferson’s language is on the correct side of the argument. This allowance
notwithstanding, the point is that the Justice’s treatment of the
issue is far from historically serious. One can only guess how he
might have responded to the observation made in this Article,
that Jefferson took up the metaphor in an attempt to limit national power, while his (Justice Black’s) own purpose was unquestionably to expand it.
2. Everson and Politics
This brings one to the crux of the matter: the most salient
fact about the majority decision in Everson is that it was a politi206

Second Inaugural, supra note 112, at para. 7.
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cal one. In its aftermath, the Supreme Court, thanks additionally to the doctrine of incorporation,207 would be emboldened by
its new authority to scrutinize all state action regarding religion
and, in turn, to outlaw any manifestation of religious devotion
that was co-mingled with a state-sponsored activity. The decision brought increased power to the Court by giving it a police
function that allowed the Court essentially to redefine appropriate secular standards in the states and to assure that they be
met. Everson, in short, had everything to do with politics and little, if anything, to do with a critical reading of history.
3. Everson and the Secular Revolution
The secular standards that Everson concretely laid down
were far from new. They were not the product of the Court’s ingenuity. They were part and parcel of the secular revolution that
had already been accomplished in this country by the turn of the
twentieth century and that had transformed Europe a century
before that. Immanuel Kant had dichotomized reason, which, he
insisted, had two spheres; one contained knowledge (with a sensible content), while the other comprised thinking (without it).
The former was a theoretical realm of science and progress,
whereas the latter was a practical one of metaphysics, morals,
and religion. Science possessed a public character, while religion
was relegated to personal and private life. The state, according
to Kant, had no right to impose any religious or moral beliefs
upon its citizens. It was to honor each person’s individual autonomy.
The Everson decision constitutionalized not only Jefferson’s
metaphor, but also imparted to it the thought patterns of the
secular revolution. Everson dictated that religious concerns and
state concerns would forevermore be separate and distinct from
each other. The state would not interfere with the autonomy of
the individual in religious matters, but would be “a neutral in its
relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers.”208
What was more, the public square would be free of religion; specifically, of any form of religious expression in schools and schoolsponsored events. Nonsectarian prayer and devotional Biblereading without comment, released time programs for religious
instruction, and any religious holiday displays would henceforth
be regarded as imposing and coercive, as the illicit importation of
private matters of faith into the public square. What the Everson
decision did not state, even though it was written in large print
between the lines, was that the Establishment Clause was to be
207
208

See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
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construed through the lens of the political dogma of liberalism,
dating back at least to Kant and provided new twists by Comte
and Spencer.
B.

The Central Notions of Liberalism

The problem with liberalism has to do with its central notions, such as state neutrality and individual autonomy. Elsewhere I have analyzed these ideas,209 and I will not attempt to
recapitulate here my previous discussions concerning them, other
than briefly to point out that state neutrality constitutes an impossibility and that individual autonomy, when divorced from
moral and religious boundaries, lends itself to anarchy and
chaos.
Consider for a moment the situation in a public school classroom, in which there is no school prayer, devotional Biblereading, singing of Christmas carols, display of the Ten Commandments, or group recitation of “under God” in the Pledge of
Allegiance. The silence is unquestionably audible. Can even a
distantly observant person think that this atmosphere does not
convey a strong impression to a student concerning the significance (or, better yet, the insignificance) of these activities in the
life of the community and in his or her life as a public citizen? If,
on the other hand, such activities are part and parcel of the
school curriculum, would any person dare defend them as “neutral”? State neutrality is a chimerical concept for law professors,
philosophers, and Supreme Court justices to ponder and to make
sense of, but it is a notion without clothing in the real world
where people interact on a daily basis with one another.
Consider too a scene that has become commonplace on the
streets of every major city in this country. A homeless drugaddict is offered, but refuses, the assistance of healthcare professionals. He or she “chooses” instead to continue living on a public
sidewalk, where all his or her bodily functions are exercised.
Does the idea of individual autonomy, unbounded by any and all
moral and religious constraint, not inure to the society’s detriment? Is such a notion not tantamount to chaos? A realm of personal, private autonomy free of any such constraint cannot be defined consistent with the goals of freedom.
State neutrality and individual autonomy, as incoherent as
both are, nonetheless constitute pillars of the secular ideal. It is
this ideal that has inspired the Lemon, the endorsement, and the
coercion tests. The “godless” state, which supposedly epitomizes
209 See “Religion-Neutral” Jurisprudence, supra note 190, and From Typology to Synthesis, supra note 81.
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neutrality, exists to safeguard the individual autonomy of its citizenry by insuring that their decision-making process is untrammeled, however slightly, by the imposition of any moral or religious value that might, by happenstance or otherwise, creep into
state-supported activity. Another name for this political regime,
according to those who support it, is “the separation of church
and state,” and among its many plaudits, is that it purportedly
honors the memory of Thomas Jefferson and other American patriots. That is as historically suspect as its central notions are
philosophically untenable.
C.

The Epistemology of Liberalism

The idea of two spheres, one secular, embodying the naturalistic pursuit of knowledge, and the other religious, encompassing
unverifiable belief and ritualistic practice, is not only unworkable, but also rests upon epistemological premises that are thoroughly doubtful, if not altogether incorrect. Kant and the other
thinkers who shaped the secular revolution in both Europe and
America were convinced that belief in God amounted to thinking
and not knowing.210 Indeed, for Comte, religious belief of any
kind was superstitious and infantile; and, according to Spencer,
religious knowledge was impossible because there was no corresponding empirical datum. Without re-tracing arguments made
elsewhere, it must suffice to observe that the argument that science is intellectually rigorous and defensible, while religion is
not, does not pass muster. The “truths” of science are not eternal. They are not part of a sphere of certitude; hence, they cannot be differentiated from religious claims in that fashion. As
Alvin Plantinga reminds us with a hint of humor, John
Trowbridge, who was chairman of the department of physics at
Harvard University in the 1880s, encouraged students not to major in physics since most discoveries in the field had already been
made;211 after all, there could be but one Newton as there was
but one universe. Plantinga also underscores the temporary
character of scientific truth, when he writes as follows: “We all
know of scientific theories that once enjoyed consensus but are
now discarded: caloric theories of heat, effluvial theories of electricity and magnetism, theories based on the existence of phlogiston, vital forces in physiology, theories of spontaneous generation
of life, the luminiferous ether, and so on.”212
See “Religion-Neutral” Jurisprudence, supra note 190, at 836–39.
Alvin Plantinga, Creation and Evolution: A Modest Proposal, in DARWINISM,
DESIGN, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 519 (John Angus Campbell & Stephen C. Meyer eds.,
2003).
212 Id.
210
211
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It is most interesting to note that Richard Rorty, one of today’s stellar proponents of liberal thought as well as a devout
atheist, explains that he is opposed to religion, but not on epistemological grounds. He is quoted as stating the following:
I do not think that Christian theism is irrational. I entirely
agree . . . that it is no more irrational than atheism. Irrationality is
not the question but rather, desirability. The only reason I can think
of for objecting to Christian theism is that a lot of Christians have
been bigoted fanatics. But of course, so have a lot of atheists. . . .
....
. . . Atheism is more practical only if you wish to form a pluralistic,
democratic society. In that situation, the persistence of the theist who
claims to know that this or that is against God’s will becomes a problem. So atheists find themselves wishing that these groups would
wither away.213

Is Rorty not effectively conceding, then, that it is indefensible to argue that Christian theism should partake of a separate
sphere because it is more irrational and more fanatically supported than a godless ideology? His point appears to be simply
that atheism is more conducive to the formation of a democratic
society. But that is a strange argument, is it not, when most of
those within American society describe themselves as “Christian?” Rorty criticizes “the persistence of the theist who claims to
know that this or that is against God’s will” but he does not disapprove of the atheist who claims to know that it is not.
D. A Political Choice
The truth that pervades Rorty’s transparent observation is
the same one that rose to the surface in our discussion of the
secular revolution and in our consideration of the Court’s embrace of the liberal, secular ideal. That truth concerns politics.
When phrased in its most elemental fashion, the issue concerns
the kind of state in which one desires to live. Does one want to
live in a secular state under a “godless Constitution,” where each
individual is an autonomous end to him- or herself, and where
autonomy may often move perilously close to chaos? Or, alternatively, does one wish to live in a state where basic moral and religious values, including the notion of deity, are upheld and promoted, but where such values may create resentment and be
experienced as an imposition? There is nothing magical about
this choice. It need not, as I have demonstrated, be covered over
with layer upon layer of historical investigation, philosophical
213 Stephen Louthan, On Religion—A Discussion with Richard Rorty, Alvin Plantinga, and Nicholas Wolterstorff, 27 CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR’S REV. 177, 178, 183 (1996).
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analysis, or judicial precedent-weighing. The problem is one that
cannot be fully resolved by resorting to any of these modes of
thought. Although they may contribute to the illumination of options, this does not alter the reality that the underlying problem
involves making an easy to understand, even crudely simple, political choice.
The choice is not a lopsided one, where only one of the combatants comes loaded with historical and empirical evidence and
heavy intellectual muscle. Except for the reality that traditional
liberalism reigns as undisputed champion throughout most elite
cultural institutions, like the academies of higher education, the
media, and the Supreme Court, the match is, in most respects, an
even contest. One searches in vain for an eternal truth dictating
that higher education must marginalize the religious impulse,
that the pursuit of science must be inextricably tied to methodological naturalism,214 and that the law must be interpreted to
mandate the secularization of the public square. Nowhere is it
written, except in the political philosophy of liberalism and its
cousins, such as naturalism and instrumentalism,215 that religious thought has to be relegated to the nethermost regions of
the mind and comprise what is ungraciously referred to, in political terms, as personal and private, or merely “sectarian,” belief.
The Supreme Court has not yet admitted what most pundits
and political interest groups already know about it; namely, that
the issues with which it, as an institution, must grapple boil
down to a political struggle, pure and simple, and that the most
significant measuring rod of where any Justice stands in the
struggle concerns the way in which he or she understands the relation of religious values to the state. By and large, liberalism’s
secular ideal still prevails on the Court, but there is reason to
suspect that the ideal may no longer have the unconditional appeal it once had. To examine this contention, I now turn to the
Court’s most recent decisions regarding the public display of the
Ten Commandments.

214 See L. Scott Smith, On Teaching Neo-Darwinism in Public Schools: Avoiding the
Pall of Orthodoxy and the Threat of Establishment, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 143,
175–78 (2005). See also Alvin Plantinga, When Faith and Reason Clash: Evolution and
the Bible, in INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS: PHILOSOPHICAL,
THEOLOGICAL, AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES 113, 136–39 (Robert T. Pennock ed., MIT
Press, 2001).
215 For an invigorating, thoughtful, and provocative discussion of the way in which
education, science, and law have been conjoined with and defined by the philosophy of
naturalism, see generally PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, REASON IN THE BALANCE: THE CASE
AGAINST NATURALISM IN SCIENCE, LAW & EDUCATION (1995). Naturalistic discourse is
one of the byproducts of a public sphere from which religion is excluded.
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V. THE PUBLIC DISPLAY OF THE TEN COMMANDMENTS
A.

Introduction

The Supreme Court, during the summer of 2005, handed
down two decisions concerning the public display of the Ten
Commandments and did so with diverse outcomes. In the Van
Orden decision, the Court held in favor of the display, but in the
McCreary County decision held against it. A consideration of the
various opinions by the Justices will aid one in understanding
where each of them stands regarding the relationship between
the state and its embodiment of religious values. More significantly, we will also be able to observe how the Justices are engaged in a political dispute, with the proponents of the liberalsecular ideal on the one side and the advocates of a state embodying some moral and religious values on the other.
B.

Van Orden v. Perry

In Van Orden,216 the text of the Ten Commandments was
displayed on a monument, six feet high and three feet wide, that
was located on twenty-two acres surrounding the Texas state
capitol and containing a number of other monuments and historical markers.217 Van Orden, the petitioner, sought first a declaration that the monument violated the Establishment Clause, and
second, an injunction for its removal.218 Chief Justice Rehnquist
wrote the plurality opinion, in which Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas joined.
1. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Plurality Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist, rejecting Van Orden’s claims, explained that the Court’s decisions under the Establishment
Clause attempt to address two concerns. The first is historical
and consists of the positive role of religion and religious traditions throughout the country’s history, while the second is philosophical and embodies the principle that state intervention in
religious matters can impede religious freedom.219 The challenge
is to respect both concerns. “Our institutions,” he reminded us,
“presuppose a Supreme Being, yet these institutions must not
press religious observances upon their citizens.”220 There must
be a respect for history and for the principle of church-state separation.
216
217
218
219
220

125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
Id. at 2858.
Id.
Id. at 2859.
Id.
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The Chief Justice, for reasons he failed to explain, does not
consider the Lemon test “useful in dealing with the sort of passive monument”221 involved in this case. The test that seems to
shape his opinion most was the one of Marsh v. Chambers222 that
tends to measure, according to the antiquity of a religious practice, whether it has a place in American public life. He recited
profusely from President Washington’s Thanksgiving Day Proclamation, in which the President announced an official day of
prayer and thanksgiving to observe “with grateful hearts, the
many and signal favors of Almighty God.”223 The Chief Justice
further noted the public place of honor provided to Moses and the
Decalogue within the Supreme Court’s own courtroom, as well as
in the rotunda area of the Jefferson Building, on the floor of the
National Archives, inside the Department of Justice, and in front
of the Ronald Reagan Building.224 He was, of course, equally
cognizant of legal precedents, like McGowan v. Maryland,225 in
which the Ten Commandments have, at least in part, been upheld in public life. The Legislative and Executive branches, he
maintained, have respectfully recognized the role of the Ten
Commandments in America’s heritage.226
The religious character of the Decalogue is openly acknowledged in this opinion, but the Chief Justice stressed that “the
Ten Commandments have an undeniable historical meaning.”227
It is really upon this “historical meaning” that his opinion turns.
That the case involved neither primary nor secondary education
and that Van Orden walked by the monument for a number of
years before bringing his lawsuit were also facts deemed highly
relevant to the opinion.228
2. Justice Thomas’s Concurrence
Justice Thomas, concurring in the Chief Justice’s opinion,
argued for returning “to the views of the Framers and adopt[ing]
coercion as the touchstone”229 for interpreting the Establishment
Clause. In this context, “coercion” means one is compelled to
take a particular action “by force of law and threat of penalty.”230
In this sense, Van Orden was obviously not coerced, and there is
Id. at 2861.
463 U.S. 783 (1983).
Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2861.
Id. at 2862.
366 U.S. 420 (1961).
Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2863.
Id.
Id. at 2863–64.
Id. at 2867 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 2865 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting))
(emphasis omitted).
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
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no cognizable establishment violation.231
By recommending that the Court “return to the views of the
Framers”232 and to “the original meaning”233 of the Establishment
Clause, Justice Thomas supported a particular historical understanding of the Constitution; i.e., the view that it was written
sympathetically to religion and was never intended to secularize
all activities sponsored by the states. He reminded us of the
doubt he expressed in the Newdow case concerning whether the
Establishment Clause is applicable to the states by reason of its
incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment.234 He continued
to leave the door ajar for the entertainment of this theoretical
possibility, by writing: “If the Establishment Clause does not restrain the States, then it has no application here, where only
state action is at issue.”235
Reasons for adopting the method of originalism, he asserted,
have to do in part with the inadequacies of the Lemon and endorsement tests, which have brought even the most trivial vestiges of the religious to the federal courthouse for litigation.236
Both tests save religious words and symbols from being stricken
down as establishment violations only by “declaring them of little
religious significance.”237 His point is that, to pass constitutional
muster, words and symbols, even when admittedly religious,
must be justified in secular terms. Such a compromise is unfair
to believers and nonbelievers alike and results finally in judicial
incoherence and confusion.238 The unintelligibility of the Court’s
body of precedents in this area serves to highlight the eyebrowraising specter that Establishment Clause cases turn finally on
“judicial predilections”239 or, in other words, on “the personal
preferences of judges.”240
3. Justice Breyer’s Concurrence
Concurring in the plurality’s judgment, Justice Breyer asserted that Establishment Clause cases are fact-intensive ones241
and that there was and is “no test-related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment.”242 He highlighted the following facts that
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242

Id.
Id. at 2867.
Id. at 2865.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2865–66.
Id. at 2866.
Id.
Id. at 2867.
Id.
Id. at 2869 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id.
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were important to him in reaching his decision: specifically, that
the monument was donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles to
shape civic morality as a way of combating juvenile delinquency,243 that its physical setting suggests little or nothing that
is religious,244 that for forty years the location of the monument
on public property was unchallenged,245 and that the display was
not on public school grounds.246
After emphasizing what he regarded as decisive facts of the
case, Justice Breyer weighed them against the Lemon test. The
Texas display, he thought, demonstrated no religious purpose, illustrated that its primary effect was neither to advance nor to
inhibit religion, and resulted in no excessive government entanglement with religion. Although his opinion happened to coincide
with the three prongs of the Lemon test,247 Justice Breyer insisted that the formulation of his opinion rested upon a consideration of the basic purposes of the Religion Clauses, i.e., to “assure the fullest possible scope of religious liberty and tolerance
for all,”248 rather than upon the application of any particular test.
4. Justice Stevens’s Dissent
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg joined in dissent, took the position that the state of Texas, by agreeing to the
placement of the monument on capitol grounds, endorsed “the divine code of the ‘Judeo-Christian’ God.”249 Justice Stevens passionately opined, “[i]f any fragment of Jefferson’s metaphorical
‘wall of separation between church and State’ is to be preserved—
if there remains any meaning to the ‘wholesome “neutrality” of
which this Court’s [Establishment Clause] cases speak,’”250 then
the subject display is unquestionably unconstitutional.
Not only does the display constitute Texas’s endorsement of
a divinely-given Code, but the state, argued Justice Stevens, is
also unwittingly fueling a sectarian conflict concerning which
version of the Code is the proper one, since the display features
one version of it to the exclusion of others.251 If this were not
enough constitutionally to condemn the display, one could likewise consider that it impermissibly prefers religion over irreli243
244
245
246
247
248

Id. at 2870.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2871.
Id.
Id. at 2868 (quoting School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305

249
250
251

Id. at 2874 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (quoting School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)).
Id. at 2879–80.

(1963)).
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gion, such that nonbelievers and polytheists are made to feel like
outsiders.252
Justice Stevens reserved his most forceful criticism for those
who advocate originalism. First, he stated that the Founders’
speeches, some of them with prolific religious allusions, should
not be interpreted as a direct reflection of the government’s position on the church-state relationship, as would the “permanent
placement of a textual religious display on state property.”253
Second, he reminded us that religious statements and proclamations were not espoused at the Constitutional Convention nor enshrined in the text of the founding document.254 Third, he observed that historical investigation renders ambiguous results,
noting that Jefferson refused to issue Thanksgiving proclamations and that Madison, in his Detached Memorandum,255 later
voiced disapproval of his public religious proclamations and of
the appointment of Congressional chaplains at state expense.256
Fourth, the Justice noted that many of the Framers understood
the word “religion” in the Establishment Clause to include only
Christian sects;257 thus, a return to the original meaning of the
word would necessitate the exclusion of those in other religions.
Fifth, he argued that the Establishment Clause narrowly constricted to the national government and not applicable to state
governments through the incorporation doctrine would mean
that a state could “constitutionally adorn all of its public spaces
with crucifixes or passages from the New Testament . . . [or]
would also have full authority to prescribe the teachings of Martin Luther or Joseph Smith as the official state religion.”258
Justice Stevens, in conclusion, emphasized, “[t]he principle
that guides my analysis is neutrality.”259 It is a principle, he asserted, rooted in this country’s history as well as in the text of the
Constitution.260
5. Justice Souter’s Dissent
The thrust of Justice Souter’s dissent, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, was that the Establishment Clause “requires neutral-

Id. at 2881.
Id. at 2883.
Id.
James Madison, A Detached Memorandum, in SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE, supra note 7, at 138, 141.
256 Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2884 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
257 Id. at 2885.
258 Id. at 2887.
259 Id. at 2889.
260 Id.
252
253
254
255
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ity as a general rule.”261 Relying upon Stone v. Graham,262 Justice Souter stated that there is no doubt the Ten Commandments
amount to a religious statement.263 When displayed on public
property any such religious text constitutes a violation of the Establishment Clause, unless the circumstances of its display indicate that it is not placed there “with a predominant purpose on
the part of government either to adopt the religious message or to
urge its acceptance by others.”264 In this instance, “the government of Texas is telling everyone who sees the monument to live
up to a moral code because God requires it.”265 Governmental
neutrality, stressed the Justice, has been lost in this instance:
“any citizen should be able to visit that civic home without having to confront religious expressions clearly meant to convey an
official religious position that may be at odds with his own religion, or with rejection of religion.”266
Justice Souter distinguished between Texas’s display of the
Decalogue and “any number of perfectly constitutional depictions”267 of it, such as the frieze in the Justices’ own courtroom,
on which Moses is secularly depicted as one lawgiver, among
many, holding the tablets of the Commandments.268 Although
the Texas display is one of numerous ones on the state capitol
grounds, Justice Souter doubted the secular purpose of it, since
he did not think that it is tied by appearance, history, or aesthetic sense to the other monuments, but stands on its own.269
C.

McCreary County, Kentucky v. ACLU of Kentucky270

1. Introduction
McCreary and Pulaski Counties, in the state of Kentucky,
conspicuously displayed the King James version of the text of the
Ten Commandments in their respective courthouses.271 After
litigation was instituted by the American Civil Liberties Union of
Kentucky against the two counties seeking to enjoin the displays,
the counties each altered their displays on two separate occasions, first by expanding the display272 and, second, by installing
Id. at 2892 (Souter, J., dissenting).
449 U.S. 39, 42–43 (1980) (holding that the mandatory posting of the Ten Commandments in public classrooms violated the Establishment Clause).
263 Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2892 (Souter, J., dissenting).
264 Id.
265 Id. at 2893 (citation omitted).
266 Id. at 2897.
267 Id. at 2894.
268 Id. at 2893–94.
269 Id. at 2895.
270 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
271 Id. at 2728.
272 Id. at 2729.
261
262
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another display that still featured the Commandments.273 In the
second display, the Commandments were central to it, but were
present along with eight small-framed documents bearing a religious theme.274 In the third display, set up after the district
court had ordered the removal of the second one in each county,
nine framed documents of equal size were posted.275 The third
display was not set up pursuant to any new county resolution.276
2. Justice Souter’s Majority Opinion
Justice Souter, with whom Justices Breyer, Stevens, Ginsburg, and O’Connor joined, emphasized that the counties’ actions
had no secular purpose and, hence, violated the “central Establishment Clause value of official religious neutrality,”277 still as
important “an interpretative guide”278 as it was in Everson.279
Reminding the two counties that “the world is not made brand
new every morning,”280 the Court, by means of the fictional “objective observer”281 of the endorsement test, is free to examine the
history of the counties’ various displays and to conclude that,
when considered together, they demonstrated a definite governmental purpose to advance a form of religion.
Justice Souter criticized the originalism of Justice Scalia, insisting that the latter’s reliance upon the Framers is at best inconclusive as there is no compelling evidence of a consensus
among them regarding the role of religion in public life. Justice
Souter further lambasted his colleague’s view that the deity of
the Framers “was the God of monotheism”282 and pointed out, a
la Justice Story, that the purpose of the Establishment Clause
was simply “‘to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects.’”283
The original meaning of the clause, in other words, did not give a
privileged place to monotheistic conceptions of deity “with Mosaic
antecedents.”284
3. Justice O’Connor’s Concurrence
Justice O’Connor joined the majority’s opinion. She mainId. at 2730.
Id. at 2729.
Id. at 2730.
Id.
Id. at 2733 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2742.
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2736.
Id. at 2735.
Id. at 2744.
Id. at 2745 (quoting Justice Story, in R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 13 (1988)) (emphasis omitted).
284 Id.
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
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tained that the Establishment Clause prohibits government coercion, preference, and endorsement in matters of religion,285 and
opined that the counties’ display “conveys an unmistakable message of endorsement to the reasonable observer.”286
4. Justice Scalia’s Dissent
Justice Scalia was joined in his dissent by the Chief Justice,
Justice Thomas, and Justice Kennedy in part, and proclaimed his
desire to return to the original meaning of the Establishment
Clause. To that end, he pointed out that the first actions by all
three branches of the national government287 were to foster morality and civil responsibility by encouraging religion.288 He adduced supportive evidence from Presidents Washington, John
Adams, Jefferson, and Madison289 and asked, “With all of this reality (and much more) staring it in the face, how can the Court
possibly assert that the ‘“the First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between . . . religion and nonreligion?’”290
The principle of religion-neutrality has, he stated, been
abandoned by the Court on a number of occasions.291 The only
“good reason”292 why the Court occasionally ignores it has to do
with the desire to save face with the American people who, he insisted, would not stand for an across-the-board application of
it.293 Because Justice Scalia rejects the principle, he found no
reason to declare that the counties’ displays of the Ten Commandments violated the Establishment Clause. According to his
reading of the Clause, it permits the disregard of polytheists as
well as of atheists.294
Justice Scalia pointed out that he has adduced in support of
his position, in contrast to that of Justice Stevens, primarily official acts and proclamations of the United States, such as the
First Congress’s commencement of the practice of legislative
prayer, its appointment of congressional chaplains, its proposal
of a Thanksgiving Proclamation, President Washington’s
Thanksgiving Proclamation, and the invocation of God at the
opening of sessions of the Supreme Court.295 In further reply to

285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295

Id. at 2746 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 2747.
Id. at 2748–49 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2749.
Id. at 2749–50.
Id. at 2750.
Id. at 2751–52.
Id. at 2752.
Id.
Id. at 2753.
Id. at 2753–54.
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his colleague, Justice Scalia maintained that, even though the
text of the Constitution may fail to elucidate the meaning of the
Establishment Clause, such official state actions do.296 In addition, the religious view supported by the Framers was, he opined,
broadly monotheistic, since they proclaimed a single beneficent
God, but never Jesus Christ.297
Justice Scalia of course took issue with the notion of the “living Constitution.”298 He questioned why, if the Constitution is
supposed to change in accordance with “democratic aspirations,”299 the same are always found in the Justices’ own personal
views of the Establishment Clause rather than in the current society’s dispositions.300
He likewise denied that his originalist position marginalizes
the belief systems of millions of Americans who are not of a
monotheistic persuasion. Far from it. Polytheism, he insisted, is
completely protected by the Religion Clauses, but it does not follow from that fact that the state’s invocation of God is an establishment.301
Justice Scalia believed that the net effect of McCreary is to
heighten the requirements of Lemon, first by justifying inquiry
into legislative purpose as a means of ascertaining how governmental action would appear to an objective observer, and second
by requiring that a secular purpose predominate over any purpose to advance religion.302 In other words, no longer is the
search for a secular purpose, but the search now consists of a rigorous and full-scale review of the facts with the idea that, in order to pass constitutional muster, any religious purpose must be
subordinate to the secular one.303
Justice Scalia concluded his dissent with the observation
that the exhibits in question were meant only to focus upon the
historic role of religious belief in the country’s communal life.
That role, he insisted, is permissible.304 To outlaw them on that
basis is to fall prey to what Justice Goldberg once called an “untutored devotion to the concept of neutrality”305 and would, without question, “commit the Court (and the Nation) to a revisionist
Id. at 2754–55.
Id. at 2755.
Id. at 2756.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 2757.
Id. at 2758.
Id. at 2762–63.
Id. at 2763 (quoting School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306
(1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
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agenda of secularization.”306
VI. ANALYSIS
A. Any Sure Verdict from History?
The opinions of the Justices concerning governmentally supported religious displays turn, in large part, upon a consideration
of the role of religion in the earliest days of the Republic. Justices Scalia and Thomas are convinced that the Framers, including Thomas Jefferson, who was not in attendance at the Constitutional Convention, appreciated public religion and desired to
encourage it. Justices Souter and Stevens, on the other hand,
entertain doubts about that proposition. Yet they all cull
through the pages of history, quick to highlight any evidence to
support their respective points-of-view. There is a veritable
mountain of evidence on either side of the issue, but these are
separated by a canyon, both deep and wide, representing the historically unknown, and perhaps unknowable. The crux of the
problem is that the Constitutional Convention did not explicitly
and substantively address the role of religion in public. Nowhere
within the paragraphs of the country’s founding document is
there so much as a reference to God. We are left, ultimately,
looking down into an abyss of silence, from and about which we
are free to conclude whatever we wish. My contention is not that
all historical investigations end in deadlock, but that the search
for a consensual view among the Founders concerning the role of
religion in public life is an investigation that has managed to
disappoint more than it has satisfied hopeful expectation. The
search has proven to be an historical dead-end.307
Arguing about that which is irresolvable raises a host of interesting questions, not the least of which is the following: “What
do we hope to accomplish by the exercise?” The issues of the deId.
Steven G. Gey, in critical response to Carl H. Esbeck’s historical conclusions from
history regarding the church-state relationship throughout the early years of the Republic, is not sanguine about the historical approach to the Religious Clauses. Gey astutely
points out, “When all is said and done, the historical account of church and state in the
early republic leaves us right where we started . . . .” See Steven G. Gey, More Or Less
Bunk: The Establishment Clause Answers That History Doesn’t Provide, 2004 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 1617, 1630 (2004). Gey further argues, “History frames the discussion about constitutional meaning and provides a context in which the various dimensions of constitutional
questions can be viewed in sharp relief. History provokes us to ask the right questions,
but it will never give us all the right answers.” Id. at 1631. With these comments, I generally agree. But then Gey, more than a bit mysteriously, adds, “However, an honest fealty to history will yield an Establishment Clause that no religiously pluralistic modern
democracy would want or accept.” Id. This statement tends to assume that an “original
meaning” is discoverable if the historical investigator is but honest in the pursuit of it.
Gey has, whether he knows it or not, stated two positions that are not compatible.
306
307
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bate may certainly be brought into stark, trenchant focus, but
that in and of itself does not issue in a resolution. Perhaps one
will be sufficiently impressed by particular strands of evidence
that he or she will venture a conclusion and defend it in a twofisted manner in a learned monograph. Yet others taking an antipodal position will do the same. The question is whether, given
the state of the evidence, the kind of historical argument in
which the Justices are engaged is not an exercise in futility.
I contend that it is, if the hope is for an answer beyond reasonable dispute. As the Justices’ expressions of opinion about establishment matters have grown increasingly animated, the
Court has become more deeply divided than ever. That is because the problem posed by the presence of religion in circles of
state is not one that will ever be resolved by historical inquiry.
Resort to the metaphorical mantra of “a wall of separation”
solves nothing; it only triggers the historical reflection that has
plunged the Court into its current morass. Historical investigation may certainly enlighten us by charting one or more plausible
explanations, but it is farfetched to believe that such investigation will one day conclude the debate.
B. A Discussion of Justice Scalia’s Originalism
Justice Scalia’s determination to uncover the original meaning of the Establishment Clause purchases a variety of assumptions that are problematic. The first is that “original meaning”
lends itself to discovery through meticulous historical investigation. This assumption is false; in fact, the “original meaning”
that one derives from an investigation appears to have as much,
if not more, to do with the historical investigator as it does the
data investigated. How are we, for example, to assess James
Madison’s Detached Memorandum? Is it a group of idle reflections teetering upon irrelevancy by virtue of having been written
by the man years after he left office? Or does the Memorandum
provide us the profoundest kind of insight into Madison’s most
seasoned thoughts? In the same way, when William Williams of
Connecticut, who suggested that the Preamble of the Constitution be modified to include reference to “the one living and true
God, the creator and supreme Governour of the world,”308 but
nonetheless approved the document without this or any other
such reference, what may we conclude by his action? Some may
argue he came to accept the notion that the Constitution is an
entirely secular document, while others may charge that, since
the choice before the state ratifying conventions was either to ac308

See William Williams to the Printer, supra note 21, at 193.
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cept or to reject the newly proposed Constitution, he chose to do
the former in the hope that the document would later be
amended. On what principled basis do we decide upon the “original meaning”?
Yet let us assume, arguendo, that the welter of historical
questions that present themselves concerning the Framers’
thoughts, ideas, and intentions regarding the relationship between religion and the state readily lend themselves to original
meaning analysis. What precisely are we to do with our conclusions? Are we free, in Pickwickian fashion, to transplant them
into our contemporary state and culture, into post-modernity if
you will? If so, how do we square original meanings with our
radically expanded notion of the state, our changing demographics, and the advent of cultural problems the Framers could
scarcely have imagined? Even Justice Scalia is not sufficiently
audacious to suggest that original meanings can broadjump into
the twenty-first century.
He has instead involved himself, perhaps unwittingly, in an
exercise chock-full of assumptions and abstractions. Consider
the progression of his argument—he defends public displays of
the Decalogue by appealing to the Framers’ monotheistic vision
of God, and then moves to a “disregard of polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities.”309 The First Commandment states,
“Thou shalt have no other gods before me.” It exemplifies a
henotheistic faith, one defined as belief in a single deity without
denying the existence of others, rather than a monotheistic faith,
which holds to belief in a single god. Justice Scalia’s transition
from the Ten Commandments to monotheism is unwarranted.
His conclusion that “polytheists and believers in unconcerned
deities” can be disregarded on the strength of the Establishment
Clause does not follow, since he has not proven that the Commandments, which he believes shaped the Framers’ religious
views, are built upon a monotheistic faith.
Even if the transition from the Commandments to the Framers’ view of God were perfectly sound, one still cannot move from
Christian monotheism to monotheism in general without engaging a formidable abstraction and being transported a considerable distance from the Framers’ original meaning. Monotheism
does not necessarily entail beneficence or grace. One may believe
in a single deity who instructs his or her devotees to kill and to
plunder their neighbors as infidels. Such a belief, I dare say, is
light-years from the notion of deity entertained by any of the
Framers. So Justice Scalia’s attempt to capture original meaning
309

McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2753 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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succeeds mainly in disclosing his own “judicial predilections” and
“personal preferences,”310 an endeavor that his comrade in arms,
Justice Thomas, roundly criticizes.
C. Justices Souter and Stevens on Neutrality
It is to Justice Breyer’s credit that he frankly admits the role
of subjective “legal judgment” in Establishment Clause cases.311
Those with whom he voted in both Van Orden and McCreary, to
be sure, exercised such judgment. Justices Stevens and Souter
did so, although they appeared to rest their judicial analysis on
the principle of neutrality. Justice Souter declared, “If neutrality
in religion means something, any citizen should be able to visit
that civic home [the capitol grounds in Texas] without having to
confront religious expressions clearly meant to convey an official
religious position that may be at odds with his own religion, or
with rejection of religion.”312 Justice Stevens also insisted, “The
principle that guides my analysis is neutrality.”313 What they
both mean by “neutrality” is that the state is to be indifferent to
religion, relegating it to a private sphere. They mean that the
Constitution is a godless document that was intended to create a
godless state. If one can walk the capitol grounds in Austin,
Texas and not be confronted by religious expressions, that suggests that religious expressions are banned there. “Neutrality,”
for these Justices, bristles with hostility to religion. I have elsewhere analyzed the various meanings of this term and concluded,
“The net effect of utilizing the concept of neutrality in religion
cases amounts to little more than judicial legerdemain and obfuscation.”314 What more can one say about judicial action that
Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2867 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 2869 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). Gregg Abbott, the Texas Attorney General who defended the constitutionality of the Decalogue display in the Van
Orden case, comments that Justice Breyer’s “‘legal judgment’ rule may prove fulcrumatic
in the future.” Gregg Abbott, Upholding the Unbroken Tradition: Constitutional Acknowledgment of the Ten Commandments in the Public Square, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 51, 59 (2005). Is it a “rule” or a judicial decision-making process? It is difficult for one
to understand how this “rule” constrains a Justice to any outcome other than the one
which he or she desires.
312 Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2897 (Souter, J., dissenting).
313 Id at 2889 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
314 “Religion-Neutral” Jurisprudence, supra note 190, at 815, 870. It is important to
realize that “neutrality” is a term that conveys various meanings, depending upon the
underlying political theory driving the interpretation of the Religion Clauses. Their opinions in these two Ten Commandments cases leave no doubt that Justices Souter and Stevens are using the term to mean indifference toward the religious, which for them has no
constructive role to play in the public arena. Yet compare their opinions here with the
majority opinion in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), emphasizing that a
school voucher program was religion-neutral, because it conferred educational benefits to
a large group of people “without reference to religion.” Id. at 653. Needless to say, Justices Souter and Stevens dissented. The latter stated that “the voluntary character of the
private choice to prefer a parochial education over an education in the public school sys310
311
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purports to be neutral toward the religious while prohibiting it in
all state-sponsored activity and, at the same time, giving the irreligious free reign?
This rhetorical question brings me to a crucial point concerning the secular ideal. The kind of neutrality that Justices Souter
and Stevens praise is that of traditional liberalism, which commits one to a secular revisionist agenda. Liberalism dichotomizes our lives into public and private spheres. Religious expression finds a home only in the latter. This means that
congressional and legislative chaplains, references to God on the
currency or in the Pledge of Allegiance, an isolated public display
of the Ten Commandments or of a crèche during the holiday season, prayer and devotional Bible-reading in public schools, and
all other references to God in the public sphere are misguided,
out-of-place, and coercive. But why must the Establishment
Clause of the Constitution be so interpreted? I have argued in
Parts II through V of this Article that such a necessity is not real,
but only imagined. Neutrality, as understood by Justices Souter
and Stevens, is shorthand for the secular ideal of traditional liberalism. That ideal is not dictated by the actual text of the Constitution any more than Justice Scalia’s original meanings.
D. Toward a Political Jurisprudence
If we reject traditional liberalism and its secular ideal and
reject Justice Scalia’s method of original meaning, where does
that leave us? It leaves us in precisely the same place where we
were following Part V of this Article. We have a political choice
to make, either in favor of the godless state or against it.
It is not popular to regard Supreme Court Justices as propounding answers to political questions. Yet that is what they do
when they confront Establishment Clause cases. Both “original
meaning” and “neutrality” analysis are ways of expressing political positions. Original meaning is an expression of what I have
elsewhere called “de facto establishmentarianism,”315 and “neutrality” embodies, as I have stated, the philosophy of liberalism.316 While neither is found in the actual text of the Constitution, both are typologies that are implied by the Religion Clauses.
tem seems to me quite irrelevant to the question whether the government’s choice to pay
for religious indoctrination is constitutionally permissible.” Id. at 685 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Souter, in a similar way, viewed the Ohio voucher program to be in conflict with Everson. Id. at 688 (Souter, J., dissenting). The meaning of neutrality depends
upon the political theory that is in place.
315 L. Scott Smith, Constitutional Meanings of “Religion” Past and Present: Explorations in Definition and Theory, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 89, 117 tbl (2004).
316 Id.
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The Supreme Court, instead of engaging in what is at best a
sophistic debate, where genuine political perspectives are camouflaged and obscured by glib discussions of “neutrality” and “original meaning,” could do much better to admit that the resolution
of Establishment Clause cases is not to be found in historical investigation, philosophical analysis, or the examination of legal
precedents, although all three may contribute to decisions. The
essential, but missing, ingredient from the Court’s discussions is
a frank acknowledgment of the importance of political typology.
“Political typology” does not suggest that there be an open,
free-for-all discussion of politics in judicial decisions, but of only
those political positions that result from combining the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment. What I mean by “combining
the Religion Clauses” may be briefly explicated as follows: the
Establishment Clause may be understood in terms of “accommodationism” or “separationism,” and the Free Exercise Clause in
terms of “narrow” or “expansive” free exercise. The various combinations of these possibilities give rise to four political points-ofview: (1) separationism and narrow free exercise—classical liberalism; (2) separationism and expansive free exercise—
communitarianism; (3) accommodationism and expansive free
exercise—revised liberalism; and (4) accommodationism and narrow free exercise—de facto establishmentarianism.
These political typologies can contribute to an overarching
synthesis, which allows one to recast the jurisprudence of religion in a straightforward and hardheadedly political fashion.
Elsewhere I have attempted to do this.317 The primary advantage of such an effort is that, while it acknowledges that the Religion Clauses lend themselves to various forms of political
analysis, it presses forward toward a comprehensive, synthetic
approach of adjudication, without allowing any one typological
position to be overwhelmed by the others. What is more, because
the approach I am defending is balanced, it might well present
itself as a helpful compromise for breaking the ideological and political logjam that presently divides the Court and that renders
its jurisprudence of religion a “muddle.”318
From Typology to Synthesis, supra note 81.
Michael W. McConnell, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Where Is the
Supreme Court Heading?, in FIRST AMENDMENT LAW HANDBOOK 269 (James L. Swanson
& Christian L. Castle eds., 1990). One may ask about Van Orden and McCreary, “Where
do these split decisions leave those desiring to post the Decalogue, or wondering if existing postings pass Constitutional muster?” See Sue Ann Mota, Competing Judicial Philosophies and Differing Outcomes: The U.S. Supreme Court Allows and Disallows the
Posting of the Ten Commandments on Public Property in Van Orden v. Perry and
McCreary County v. ACLU, 42 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 99 (2006), in which the author attempts to give the reader guidelines by which to chart constitutionality. Id. at 120. Such
an effort is largely misspent. The fact is that there is a political tug-of-war occurring on
317
318
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CONCLUSION
“Does God belong in American public life?” is the question
with which we began. The answer is nowhere explicitly set forth
in the Constitution, nor is it unambiguously suggested by a study
of the Framers’ ideas and actions. Any answer to the question
derived from in-depth historical inquiry will, at best, receive only
support from, not be necessitated by, that inquiry. Kramnick
and Moore, as I have argued, will convince no one of the truth of
their thesis who is not already convinced. After examining the
historical evidence pertaining to whether the Constitution was
intended to create a godless state, a fair-minded investigator, not
given to tendentious examination of the sources, will admit that
he or she is unsure.
The historical uncertainty that looms over this question
compels one to ask another: Why, then, has the Establishment
Clause, since Everson, been interpreted as if the Constitution
were intended to give birth to a secular state? I have argued that
this has little to do with the Constitution and most everything to
do with the secular revolution that roared like a tsunami over
Europe and began flooding into this country during the last half
of the nineteenth century. By the end of that century, higher
education, the pursuit of the natural sciences, and the study of
law had begun functioning in a secular mode. By the middle of
the twentieth century, the Supreme Court had interpreted the
Establishment Clause as erecting a “wall” by which to protect the
state from the slightest vestiges of religion. The Court, by means
of the incorporation doctrine and a disregard for the balances of
federalism, had essentially proclaimed itself the unconditional
guardian of liberty, who meticulously polices the “high and impregnable wall” separating American public life from religious
words and actions. I have suggested, categorically and unabashedly, that the Court’s secularization agenda was an attempt to
enhance its own power as well as to walk in step with the intelligentsia’s secular revolution.
One’s answer to the question posed by this Article, I have
also maintained, comes down in the final analysis to a political
determination. Either one accepts the idea of a secular state or
one rejects it. There is no place to look outside politics for a definitive answer.

the Court, and Establishment decisions hang frequently by a mere thread. What is at
stake is whether the secular ideal of traditional liberalism, as set forth in Everson, will
continue to survive. There is little for the practitioner to do than to present the most
compelling arguments he or she can on one side or the other, with the realization that the
debate is essentially about politics, not interpreting the fine points of legal precedent.

299-358 SMITH.DOC

358

5/30/2007 9:58:56 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 10:299

The Supreme Court’s recent adjudication of two cases involving the public display of the Ten Commandments demonstrates
the inconclusiveness of any historical argument, since the same
Justices in both cases adduced evidence to affirm one display and
to outlaw the other. The thoroughly transparent arguments in
behalf of “original meaning” and “neutrality” serve only to highlight the underlying political nature of the question before the
Justices and their political treatment of it.
Finally, I have recommended that the Court break its blockage of discourse and self-consciously adopt a political theory of
religion-jurisprudence, one that holds together the strongest
points of the political typologies that emerge from a consideration
of the Religion Clauses. Since the Court is involved in political
policymaking anyway, such a theory would not be an extreme
departure from its routine practice. Yet the theory would demand that the Court honestly acknowledge the political nature of
the subject matter. The balance in the theory would also comprise a kind of compromise, since using the theory means holding
all political perspectives in a synthetic unity without allowing
one perspective to be overwhelmed by the rest. The notion of deity, conceived in a broad, but not explicitly Christian manner (de
facto establishmentarianism), can and should belong to American
public life, along with a respect for the values of individual
autonomy (classical liberalism), freedom of association (communitarianism), and freedom of expression (new liberalism).319
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See From Typology to Synthesis, supra note 81.

